本周观点变化>>
Ø 新增推荐&观点变化
1、途牛(TOUR)。
本周我们调研拜访了途牛，调研记录如下；我们还需进一步分析和调研才能对公司给出投资建议。
1）在线旅游市场：
在线机票酒店市场：主要有携程、去哪儿、美团（今年整体大概450亿，其中大几十亿是低端的机票酒店）；
旅游产品：分为跟团和自助，自助线上占比稍大于跟团，线下基本都是跟团；
旅游市场线上＋线下大约3940亿市场空间，CAGR13.5-13.6％，线上渗透率约7.7%， 55/45%。
目前跟团市场130-140亿，自助160-170亿；
途牛跟团游大约占20%左右市场份额，其次携程10%份额；
自助游方面携程份额较大比较多，大多是商务用户在携程上购买机票+酒店的度假产品，途牛这部分大概去年十多个亿。
2）近期行业变化：
十月份新旅游法颁布
泰国政变，马拉西亚飞机事件，导致东南亚区域份额急速减少，东南亚之前份额占途牛收入大约15%，在20142Q只有7%；
携程2013年前三季度 30-40%收入增长，20134Q－20141Q~10%；
途牛之前是~70-80%的增长，20134Q－20141Q~10%，20142Q增长回至85%。
3）VS携程：
途牛75%之外都是境外游，更多的是跟团游，携程更多的是自助；
携程80%出发在一线城市，途牛这一比例在50%，途牛在二三线城市占有率领先；
携程客户很多都是商旅客户转向度假产品，途牛是休闲旅游。
4）客单价：
途牛周边游客单价大约300元，跟团游~4000多块，整体自助~5000人民币。
5）服务模式：
服务的需求比较高，不仅仅是ecommerce的模式，途牛和消费者直接签合同；
销售有500人以上团队，按照目的地来区分，一般叫旅游顾问；
售前有72小时客服，（其他携程、去哪儿都没有，去哪儿是平台模式，需要对接小的商户）；
途牛专注在休闲旅游；
全国有83个出发城市、20个服务中心；线下对客户的服务，包括签证材料、面对面材料，其实都可以全部线上进行。本地资源采购，之后还会有扩张，在广州深圳开设分公司，就可以与当地旅行社达成更好的关系。
主要在旅游顾问的工资3-4%，call center 2-3%，还有一部分是门店租金。
6）SKU：
跟团20万个SKU，自助12万。
7）VS线下市场：
途牛价格更透明与便宜；
选择性更多；
途牛有自己的服务体系；
公司认为行业正处在加速发展阶段，刚过turning point，目前首要目标还是扩展市场份额。
8）产品挑选：
资源方：航空公司、地结社、景区、批发商、零售商；
供应商包括上游的批发商和资源方，4000多个supplier，主要是取代线下门店的生意；
自行采购，；按照线路和目的地，有一定的采购预算，销售预估；
挑选产品，例如一季度发现日韩旅行增长翻倍，会加大采购，跟团主要是批发商为主，跟团是批发加资源方
9）市场期间费用及净利的提升：
一半都是品牌投入，另一半是线上；
认为高单价对品牌的依赖和影响比较大，所以市场费用今年还会增长，参考之前京东电商的爆发式增长阶段的市场投入，认为市场费用目前在扩大市场份额阶段很有必要，之后也会比较容易leverage；
从毛利提升的角度出发，跟团游毛利在7-8%、自助在~6%，跟团会根据量的提升一级供应商的选择较少中间费用；
自助加上零售，大约有15%的毛利，其中零售有7-8%。根据市场的增量以及溢价能力，期望以后批发+零售能够做到17%的毛利，其中零售9-10%毛利、批发9-10%毛利。批发主要通过采购提升毛利（一般线下地接社有20%的毛利，这部分可以通过加大直采）。
这样的话，整体而言毛利如果通过以上措施和假设达到18%，marketing3-4%， R&D3-4%，operating expense 7%；这样如二季度电话会议里的指引，净利未来可以达到~3%。
2、科技股有无调整的风险？
首先要声明的是我们不是策略研究员，作为一个基于产业研究的成长股挖掘团队，并无能力回答此类问题。这里仅仅是描述一种现象。
本周我们注意到在硅谷十分有影响力、且之前一是对科技股say no bubble的Marc Andreessen开始提示科技股出现泡沫，且市场的热度十分不寻常。我们认为这是一个需要引起投资者警惕的信号，因为：
1）MarcAndreessen是Netscape的founder，和Ben Horowitz联合创立风险投资公司AndreessenHorowitz(AH)，是硅谷最顶级的VC之一，他也是我们心目中科技股投资前三名，他本人在硅谷有十分巨大的影响力。
2）MarcAndreessen在去年至今年上半年，一直认为科技股no bubble；一名有巨大影响力的乐观者观点开始变化，值得注意。
3）本周在港我们拜访几个大的fund时，一个细节引起我们关注。前不久美国某场卖方会议时，一家Market Cap在60billion规模的公司的投资者见面会，会场挤满了人；与去年底和今年初会场的参加者情况形成较大对比。
4）虽然上证指数尚在辩牛熊，但实际上这轮以新兴产业和向新兴产业转型为主线的行情，启动时间点、幅度都与美国科技股、中概股保持大致的一致。所以需要关注美国科技股的方向，是否有可能出现20-30%的调整？
注：再次强调，我们并无能力回答策略性的问题；且我们对未来1-3年的投资机会和市场保持乐观，这轮本质上由互联网技术和渗透率进步带来的行情，其持续时间和幅度很可能远远超市场预期，且投资机会将层出不穷！但不排除调整的可能性。
附上Marc Andreessen的观点：
Netscapefounder and Andreessen Horowitz partner Marc Andreessen has joined the chorusof people warning that startups are taking on too much risk and burning toomuch cash.
Theso-called startup burn rate conversation was sparked by Benchmark's BillGurley, who recently told The Wall StreetJournal that "Silicon Valley as a whole ... is taking on an excessiveamount of risk right now." He believes startups are burning a dangerousamount of cash — an amount that resembles 1999 just before the dotcom bubbleburst.
Herewas Andreessen's own warning on Twitter: "When the market turns, andit will turn, we will find out who has been swimming without trunks on. Manyhigh burn rate companies will VAPORIZE."
Overthe past few years, it's been relatively easy for startups to raise money fromventure capitalists. In some cases, they're raising hundreds of millions ofdollars to keep their companies afloat. But behind the scenes, they're plowingthrough that money either on marketing, overhead, or some other expense, whichresults in high burn rates. These bloated companies are using their millions tohide serious flaws in their business models.
Union SquareVentures' Fred Wilson agreed withGurley, stating: "We have multiple portfolio companies burningmultiple millions of dollars a month. Thankfully its not our entire portfolio.But it is more than I’d like and more than I’m personally comfortablewith."
Wilson'sfirm has invested in companies such as MongoDB, Twitter, Foursquare, Zynga andTumblr. Gurley's has invested in Snapchat, Uber, OpenTable and Yelp. NowAndreessen, who's an investor in Pinterest, Foursquare and Fab, also says thetech world should be worried.
Highburn rates are dangerous for a few reasons. Andreessen explains:
1. High burn prevents a company frombeing able to adapt quickly if the market changes.
2. Excessive amounts of capitalallow companies to hire like crazy rather than operate efficiently. Hiring isan easy-sounding solution to many problems startups face. But once a startupstops being lean, it can become slow to execute and mismanaged.
3. Raising a lot of money gives theillusion that a startup has made it: salaries can be high, offices can beglamorous, and it can make employees feel a false sense of relief, like all itshard work is done.
4. When you're a bloated company,raising money to support that size operation can be hard to do. "High cashburn startups almost never survive down rounds. VAPORIZE," Andreessenreiterates.
5. When the market turns, bigcompanies stop buying startups. And if you have a high burn rate, no one willbuy you.
Andreessen'sfinal message to the tech industry:
"Worry."
Here'sthe complete 18-Tweet tweetstorm, below.
1)Cash burn rates at startups: Recently @bgurley and @fredwilsonhave sounded a vivid alarm.
http://online.wsj.com/articles/venture-capitalist-sounds-alarm-on-silicon-valley-risk-1410740054
2) I said at the time that I agree with much of what Billsays (https://twitter.com/pmarca/status/511617992757506048 …), and I want to expand on the topic further.
3) New founders in last 10 years have ONLY been inenvironment where money is always easy to raise at higher valuations. THAT WILLNOT LAST.
4) When the market turns, and it will turn, we will find outwho has been swimming without trunks on: many high burn rate co's willVAPORIZE.
5) High cash burn rates are dangerous in several ways beyondthe obvious increased risk of running out of cash. Important to understand why
6) First: High burn rate kills your ability to adapt as youlearn & as market changes. Co becomes unwieldy, too big to easily changecourse.
7) Second: Hiring people is easy; layoffs are devastating.Hiring for startups is effectively one way street. Again, can't change oncestuck.
8) Third: Your managers get trained and incented ONLY tohire, as answer to every question. Company bloats & becomes badly run atsame time.
9) Fourth: Lots of people, big shiny office, high expensebase = Fake "we've made it!" feeling. Removes pressure to deliverreal results.
10) Fifth: More people multiplies communication overheadexponentially, slows everything down. Company bogs down, becomes bad place towork.
11) Sixth: Raising new money becomes harder & harder. Youhave bigger bulldog to feed, need more and more $ at higher and highervaluations.
12) Therefore you take on escalating risk of a catastrophicdown round. High-cash-burn startups almost never survive down rounds. VAPORIZE.
13) Further, to get into this position, you probably had toraise too much $ at too high valuation before; escalates down round riskfurther.
14) Seventh: Even if you CAN raise an up round, you areincreasingly likely to incur terrible structural terms like ratchets to chinthe bar.
15) That nice hedge fund investor willing to hit yourvaluation bar? Imagine him owning 80% of co after down round. How nice will hebe then?
16) Eighth: When market turns, M&A mostly stops. Nobodywill want to buy your cash-incinerating startup. There will be no Plan B.VAPORIZE.
17) Finally, there are exceptions to all this. But if you'rereading this, you're almost certainly not one. They are few and far between.
18) Worry.
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