【行业报告】2025年航运展望 - Xeneta（国际知名海运市场分析平台）

报告预计，2024年的集装箱总需求增长率将达到4%~5%，突破1.8亿个标准箱，超过2021年1.798亿个标准箱，达历史最高水平。Xeneta分析师认为，这主要是因为托运人大量提前装载货物出口，确保有足够的货物库存，以保障供应链。

If 2024 has been a year framed by conflict in the Red Sea, then expect more of the same because there is no sign of a political resolution that would allow a large-scale return of container ships to the region.

This only heightens the danger for container shipping because there is little slack in the system to deal with another supply chain shock.

The Xeneta Ocean Outlook 2025 makes clear the impact diversions around Africa have on TEU-mile demand and available capacity in the market. New deliveries of ships and slowing TEU-volume growth will ease some of this burden, but not enough to mitigate another major incident.

Could we see a military escalation in the Taiwan Strait? Will regime change in Bangladesh cause further unrest? Will the situation in the Middle East deteriorate to impact shipping in the Persian Gulf? The lights are flashing red on the geo-political dashboard and it would be a foolish to ignore them.

Other factors must be added into the mix.

The potential for new US tariffs on Chinese goods could see a spike in freight rates and shippers rushing to frontload imports. Will we see continued demand growth from China to Mexico as a ‘back door’ into the US? The threat of further strike action at ports on the US East Coast and Gulf Coast in January also looms large.

Another one to watch is how shippers, freight forwarders and carriers react to the new alliances as they are rolled out in Q1 2025.

Spot markets have been softening on major fronthauls out of the Far East since peaking in July, which is good news for shippers ahead of new long-term contract negotiations. However, it will not take much to push the needle back into the red alert zone and the logistic markets to spiral once again.

One factor working in shippers’ favor is that they have access to more data and insight than ever before. This means they can closely monitor freight spend on individual corridors and benchmark carriers against schedule reliability, capacity, transit times and CO2 emissions.

2024 has been a bruising year for shippers and they will hope 2025 brings some relief - but it is important to be realistic and prepare for further disruption.

The Xeneta Ocean Outlook 2025 will highlight the key themes and risks to consider in the face of ocean container shipping market uncertainty so you can keep supply chains moving, manage budgets effectively and maintain good supplier relationships.

Xeneta's global average spot rate has softened since peaking in July as the long term market begins to rise.

The narrowing of the long-short market will be of great significance ahead of negotiations for new long term contracts in 2025.

Shippers will be hoping the markets narrow further while carriers are doing their utmost to keep the spot market elevated.

Source: www.xeneta.com

Macro-economic outlook

Scenario 1: No return of container ships to the Red Sea

• Conflict in the wider Middle East, which formed the backdrop for Houthi attacks of ships in the Red Sea, is escalating and showing no signs of a resolution.
• Carriers will be mindful of the risk attacks pose to their crew and ships, with multiple fatalities since the crisis began.

• Average distance sailed will remain broadly the same as in 2024, which means growth in TEU-mile demand will closely follow growth measured in volumes.
• Capacity tightness will ease as new ships are delivered.
• Longer transit times now built into supply chains.
• Freight rates continue to ease as growing fleet absorbs diversions.

Scenario 2: Full Return

Major carriers return to the Red Sea in a short period of time if threat is deemed to have passed.

In announcing their 2025 services, several carriers published two versions - one where ships continue to sail around the Cape of Good Hope and the other going through the Red Sea. Despite this, there is little else to suggest a full return is likely in 2025.

• Average sailing distance drops to pre-crisis levels which leads to a drop in TEU-mile demand. Even with 3% growth in global volumes, TEU-mile demand would be down 11% from 2024.
• Congestion at major ports in the immediate period following a return to Red Sea.
• Shippers adjust to a return of shorter transit times.
• Capacity previously absorbed by the diversions is freed up which floods the market.
• Freight rates drop unless carriers are very effective at managing capacity, but this would be difficult.
• Charter rates drop and demolition increases.

Scenario 3: Partial return

Select carriers choose to return if they deem the risk low enough. One carrier returning to the Red Sea does not mean other carriers will follow if they deem their risk profile to be higher.

China-affiliated ships are at the lower end of the risk scale. Therefore, even if the Chinese carrier COSCO makes a full return in 2025, European carriers will not necessarily follow.

• Assuming global volume growth of 3% in 2025 this would lead to a year-on-year change in TEU-mile demand of between +3% and -11%.
• Easing of pressure on capacity, with wider impact on charter market and demolition activity.
• Freight rates to ease unless carriers can successfully manage capacity.
• New alliances adapt as individual carriers make individual calls on their fleet.

The carriers and alliances driving fleet growth

MSC is the single carrier expecting the most new tonnage, with 582 000 TEU scheduled for delivery in 2025* in the form of 46 new ships (source: Clarksons). The vast majority are owned by MSC with nine owned by non-operating owners (NOOs) and chartered to MSC. These deliveries will extend MSC’s status as the globe’s largest carrier, with the new deliveries adding to its current market share of 20% affording it the scale to attempt a non-alliance approach from 2025.

OCEAN Alliance - the only unchanged alliance - will see the most capacity delivered in 2025. The three carriers that make up the alliance (COSCO Group, CMA CGM and Evergreen) have 591 000 TEU scheduled for delivery next year.

The new Premier Alliance - already the smallest alliance after losing Hapag-Lloyd - will see the lowest deliveries of new ships at ‘only’ 230 000 TEU. Looking into the details of the three carriers in this alliance, ONE accounts for 176 000 TEU with HMM making up the remainder, meaning Yang Ming has no deliveries scheduled in 2025. In fact, Yang Ming only has five ships in its orderbook, all 15 500 LNG capable ships to be delivered in 2026.

The only other top 10 carrier not expecting any ships is ZIM. It is waiting for the delivery of six ships in 2024, some of which may only arrive in 2025, but after that has an empty orderbook.

Charter market

Out of the top 10 carriers, ZIM has the highest share of chartered capacity at 91.3% with Yang Ming in third place at 56.9% (Source: Alphaliner). Other carriers also rely heavily on the charter market, but this is often on long-term arrangements agreed with NOOs at the time of the ship being ordered.

Any ambitions ZIM and Yang Ming may have to grow their fleets in 2025 will rely on the shorter term charter market – but this option is limited. Alphaliner reports that, as of the end of September, only 0.6% of the global fleet is idle, of which only one is an NOO ship above 3 000 TEU.

The average charter rate for a 6 800 TEU ship is currently USD 67 500 per day for a 6-12 month contract.

A reliance on the charter market has benefits to carriers, but when the market is tight, they can struggle to find available tonnage at a time when they are most keen to add to their fleet.

Demolition

In the first nine months of 2024, the average age of ships being demolished is 29.2. This is up from the 26.5 between 2020 and 2023, which was much higher than the previous four-year average of 21.8 years.

The key to understanding the outlook for demolition is found in charter rates. High demand for tonnage during much of the past five years mean charter rates have been high, extending the lifetime of older and less efficient ships as even they will be profitable when charter rates are high.

Some will argue that once the strain on capacity eases, carriers will turn to demolition to re-balance the fleet to match that of demand for transportation. However, even if we assume a return to the pre-pandemic average, and assume three-quarters of ships currently over 22 years will be sent for demolition, this would result in 1.8m TEU leaving the fleet.

Even this high level of demolition would not be enough to turn carrier fortunes around in the case of a return to the Red Sea and the inevitable overcapacity in the market given the many millions of TEU delivered over the past four years.

Footnote: *Expected deliveries include Xeneta’s estimates that 10% of contracts will be cancelled and 10% delayed to the following year, whereas scheduled deliveries include all ships with a delivery date in 2025.

Limited port calls in Singapore

Conflict in the Red Sea saw carriers re-route services around Africa and inadvertently cause the major transshipment hub of Singapore to become an epicenter for congestion.

If shippers are looking to avoid Singapore in 2025, they may turn to Gemini’s hub and spoke model, with services calling at neighboring Tanjung Pelepas on the fronthaul to Europe and Mediterranean. On the backhaul, most services will stop at Singapore and not Tanjung Pelepas.

Conversely, six out of seven services by MSC stop in Singapore on both fronthaul and backhauls routes.

Transit times

Gemini is claiming overall reduction in transit time on major corridors due to ‘improved network’, citing 32 days from Shanghai to Rotterdam. MSC puts transit time on the same route at 35-42 days.

This is where MSC’s slot swaps with the Premier Alliances come into play, allowing it to compete with Gemini and Ocean Alliance on transit times.

Winners and losers at port level

Shifting alliances will have a big impact at port level.

If you are shipping cargo from the Far East to Antwerp, then MSC is likely to be your preferred supplier with four weekly calls in 2025. This compares to one call a week with Premier Alliance and none from Gemini.

A key point for shippers is to not assume your existing carriers will continue to call at the same ports in 2025.

Xeneta data is supporting shippers in identifying the right provider for their supply chain by benchmarking providers’ port-to-port freight rates, reliability, capacity, transit times, surcharges and CO2 emissions.

Carrier and freight forwarder strategies

Some of the shifts in alliances can be explained by carriers’ different strategies. Maersk and MSC being a clear example, the former concentrating on becoming an integrator with a heavy exposure to the long term market, contrasting with the latter’s concentration on being a carrier with a higher spot market exposure. While MSC has been buying freight forwarders, it keeps them under a separate brand, much like CMA CGM with CEVA, whereas Maersk is keeping it under the same brand.

Shippers should take these different strategies into account, considering the benefits and disadvantages of each and how they apply to their supply chains – there is no one answer fits all. Freight forwarders also need to make their own decisions – but may well find it easier to work with carriers such as CMA CGM and MSC on the ocean side who are not direct competitors as Maersk is striving to be.

There are also changes on the freight forwarder side, the most notable being DSV’s acquisition of DB Schenker*, the outcome of which is at yet unknown, but just as with shifting alliances, shippers should be awake to the changes and understand how best to react to them.

New customers are always up for grabs following a mega-merger and this time will be no different as freight forwarders compete to gain market share.

Footnote: Integration of Schenker into DSV is expected to begin in Q2-2025 following regulatory approvals and conditions fulfilled.

The threat of geo-politics and regional disputes on supply chains has been clear and present during 2024 – and these major disruptions are now happening with increasing frequency and severity. Shippers should expect and plan for further turmoil in 2025.

Conflict in Middle East and Red Sea attacks

Conflict between Israel and Hamas has served as the backdrop to Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea. There is little prospect of the situation improving in 2025.

This means ocean supply chains will continue to be impacted, not only in respect of long and short term freight rates, but also transit times, capacity restraints and congestion.

Panama Canal drought

There is better news at the Panama Canal, which has seen restrictions due to drought during 2024. The Gatun Lake water level stood at 86.2 feet on 7 October 2024, which is well above the five-year average for the month. The restrictions which have plagued this vital maritime artery should not be an issue in 2025.

US strike threat

While port strikes on the US East and Gulf Coasts ended after three days, a final agreement has yet to be signed. A new deadline of 15 January has been set to allow further negotiations but with the issue of automation remaining a highly-contention issue, further strike action cannot be ruled out in 2025. This would coincide with pre-Chinese New Year volumes meaning the impact of a strike would still be severe.

Trade tensions and tariffs

The next occupant of the Oval Office will have a big influence on ocean container shipping in 2025. Donald Trump has promised heightened tariffs on Chinese goods (and goods from the rest of the world) should he be the next US President.

Tariff retaliation would then be expected from China should Trump get his way. We are already seeing China diversify its exports to other nations, including some which will be used as a stop to avoid tariffs when eventually moved into the US.

Preparing for the unknown

Other potential flashpoints threaten supply chains in 2025, whether it is regime change in Bangladesh, military action in the Taiwan Strait or even another global pandemic or climate-related incident.

Many shippers have now moved away from just-in-time to just-in-case in their supply chains during 2024, frontloading imports earlier in the year following outbreak of conflict in the Red Sea and threat of strikes on the US Atlantic coasts.

Shippers should move away from freight procurement strategies that focus purely on cost to one which balances getting the lowest possible rate with a higher service level. Using data to position your business at the right level in the market makes it more likely you can work with your carrier or freight forwarder to find a mutually-agreeable solution to protect supply chains when the next black swan event arrives.

Longer sailing distances due to diversions in the Red Sea have seen a massive increase in emissions globally in 2024. For example, on the Far East to Mediterranean frontal, emissions per tonne of cargo (as measured by Xeneta Carbon Emissions Index) was up 60.1% in Q3 this year compared to 12 months ago.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) continues to push the industry towards the targets it agreed in 2023 to reduce carbon emissions 40% by 2030, 70% by 2040 and net zero by around 2050. The measures include reducing the GHG intensity of ship fuel and a global levy on GHG emissions. The IMO has set a deadline for regulation on both these points to be defined and adopted by the Autumn of 2025, though they will only come into force in 2027.

The global levy on GHG emissions would lower the price difference between cheaper fossil fuels and greener alternatives.

EU ETS surcharges

As shipping’s inclusion in the scheme ramps up in 2025, carriers will have to buy allowances for 70% of emissions covered by the scheme on sailings to/from/within Europe, up from 40% in 2024 - so shippers should expect to see this reflected in higher EU ETS surcharges.

The price for EU allowancces (EUA) stands at USD 72.2 per allowance, almost the same as it was at the start of the year. Each allowance covers 1 tonne of CO2 emissions.

Impact of Red Sea on surcharges

From the Far East to Europe – a trade heavily impacted by the Red Sea conflict - the average EU ETS surcharge on long term rates has increased by around 25% compared to the start of the year, up to USD 60 per FEU into North Europe and USD 49 into the Mediterranean.

An even bigger increase can be found on the backhaul from the Mediterranean to the Far East, up by 75% to USD 35 per FEU.

In contrast, the Transatlantic trades from North Europe to the US East Coast and South American East Coast – which are not operationally impacted by the Red Sea conflict – have seen average surcharges on long term rates fall by around 11% to USD 58 per FEU and USD 46 respectively.

Keeping an eye on the EUAs price development will provide some insight into how the surcharges will develop. For shippers on Red Sea impacted trades, any large-scale return should also lower EU ETS surcharges, as well as lower fuel surcharges more generally.

New fleet has split approach to fuel capability

Almost three quarters of the capacity scheduled to be delivered in 2025 has some form of alternative fuel capability, or is built in such a way that that a conversion to alternative fuel can be done relatively easily.

43% of the capacity scheduled to be delivered (830 300 TEU) will be able to sail on LNG. This is considerably more than the 513 000 TEU entering the fleet with no additional alternative fuel options. Methanol capable ships also make up a considerable share of new capacity at 373 000 TEU.

Only two of the top 10 carriers will not have any new ships with some form of alternative fuel. These are Evergreen and OOCL.

Otherwise, carriers are broadly split in 2025 between those whose ships will be methanol capable - including COSCO, HMM and Maersk - and those whose new ships will be able to sail on LNG - including Hapag-Lloyd and MSC.

It’s important to note that while these ships will be able to sail on an alternative fuel type, they will also be able to use traditional bunker fuels.

Xeneta data allows shippers to benchmark carriers CO2 performance across the world’s major trades, meaning they can factor emissions as well as cost and reliability in their procurement strategy.