期刊名称：American Economic Review
本期期卷：Vol. 112 No. 9
刊出日期：September 2022
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01 Belief Elicitation and Behavioral Incentive Compatibility
David Danz, Lise Vesterlund, Alistair J. Wilson
02 Dividend Taxes and the Allocation of Capital
Charles Boissel, Adrien Matray
03 The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China
Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian,Yang Yao
04 Rational Illiquidity and Consumption: Theory and Evidence from Income Tax Withholding and Refunds
Michael Gelman, Shachar Kariv, Matthew D. Shapiro，Dan Silverman
05 Measuring Racial Discrimination in Bail Decisions
David Arnold, Will Dobbie.Peter Hull
06 Separating Ownership and Information
Paul Voss, Marius Kulms
07 Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii
08 Experimental Cost of Information
Tommaso Denti, Massimo Marinacci, Aldo Rustichini
09 Methods Matter: p-Hacking and Publication Bias in Causal Analysis in Economics: Comment
Sebastian Kranz, Peter Pütz
10 Methods Matter: p-Hacking and Publication Bias in Causal Analysis in Economics: Reply
Abel Brodeur, Nikolai Cook, Anthony Heyes
Belief Elicitation and Behavioral Incentive Compatibility
Author：
David Danz, Lise Vesterlund, Alistair J. Wilson
Abstract：
Subjective beliefs are crucial for economic inference, yet behavior can challenge the elicitation. We propose that belief elicitation should be incentive compatible not only theoretically but also in a de facto behavioral sense. To demonstrate, we show that the binarized scoring rule, a state-of-the-art elicitation, violates two weak conditions for behavioral incentive compatibility: (i) within the elicitation, information on the incentives increases deviations from truthful reporting; and (ii) in a pure choice over the set of incentives, most deviate from the theorized maximizer. Moreover, we document that deviations are systematic and center-biased, and that the elicited beliefs substantially distort inference.
Dividend,Taxes, Allocation of Capital
Author：
Charles Boissel, Adrien Matray
Abstract：
This paper investigates the 2013 threefold increase in the French dividend tax rate. Using administrative data covering the universe of firms from 2008 to 2017 and a quasi-experimental setting, we find that firms swiftly cut dividend payments and used this tax-induced increase in liquidity to invest more. Heterogeneity analyses show that firms with high demand and returns on capital responded most while no group of firms cut their investment. Our results reject models in which higher dividend taxes increase the cost of capital and show that the tax-induced increase in liquidity relaxes credit constraints, which can reduce capital misallocation.
The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China
Author：
Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian，Yang Yao
Abstract：
We posit that autocrats introduce local elections when their bureaucratic capacity is low. Local elections exploit citizens' informational advantage in keeping local officials accountable, but they also weaken vertical control. As bureaucratic capacity increases, the autocrat limits the role of elected bodies to regain vertical control. We argue that these insights can explain the introduction of village elections in rural China and the subsequent erosion of village autonomy years later. We construct a novel dataset to document political reforms, policy outcomes, and de facto power for almost four decades. We find that the introduction of elections improves popular policies and weakens unpopular ones. Increases in regional government resources lead to loss of village autonomy, but less so in remote villages. These patterns are consistent with an organizational view of local elections within autocracies.
Rational Illiquidity and Consumption: Theory and Evidence from Income Tax Withholding and Refunds
Author：
Michael Gelman，Shachar Kariv, Matthew D. Shapiro, Dan Silverman
Abstract：
Low liquidity and a high marginal propensity to consume are tightly linked. This paper analyzes this link in the context of income tax withholding and refunds. A theory of rational cash management with income uncertainty endogenizes the relationship between illiquidity and the marginal propensity to consume, and can explain the finding that households tend to spend tax refunds as if they valued liquidity, yet do not act to increase liquidity by reducing their withholding. The theory is supported by individual-level evidence based on financial account records, including a positive correlation between the size of tax refunds and the marginal propensity to consume out of those refunds.
Measuring Racial Discrimination in Bail Decisions
Author：
David Arnold, Will Dobbie.Peter Hull
Abstract：
We develop new quasi-experimental tools to measure disparate impact, regardless of its source, in the context of bail decisions. We show that omitted variables bias in pretrial release rate comparisons can be purged by using the quasi-random assignment of judges to estimate average pretrial misconduct risk by race. We find that two-thirds of the release rate disparity between White and Black defendants in New York City is due to the disparate impact of release decisions. We then develop a hierarchical marginal treatment effect model to study the drivers of disparate impact, finding evidence of both racial bias and statistical discrimination.
Separating Ownership and Information
Author：
Paul Voss, Marius Kulms
Abstract：
This paper identifies an upside of the separation of ownership and control, typically the source of inefficiencies in the theory of the firm. Because insiders obtain private information by exercising control, the separation of ownership and control leads to a separation of ownership and information. We show that this separation is necessary for efficient trade in the market for corporate control. The analysis reveals how strategic communication between inside and outside shareholders facilitates takeovers by eliciting external bidders' private information. Our results call into question mandatory disclosure requirements during takeovers.
Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies
Author：
Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii
Abstract：
We formulate a model of social interactions and misinferences by agents who neglect assortativity in their society, mistakenly believing that they interact with a representative sample of the population. A key component of our approach is the interplay between this bias and agents' strategic incentives. We highlight a mechanism through which assortativity neglect, combined with strategic complementarities in agents' behavior, drives up action dispersion in society (e.g., socioeconomic disparities in education investment). We also suggest that the combination of assortativity neglect and strategic incentives may be relevant in understanding empirically documented misperceptions of income inequality and political attitude polarization.
Experimental Cost of Information
Author：
Tommaso Denti, Massimo Marinacci, Aldo Rustichini
Abstract：
We relate two main representations of the cost of acquiring information: a cost that depends on the experiment performed, as in statistical decision theory, and a cost that depends on the distribution of posterior beliefs, as in applications of rational inattention. We show that in many cases of interest, posterior-based costs are inconsistent with a primitive model of costly experimentation. The inconsistency is at the core of known limits to the application of rational inattention in games and, more broadly, in equilibrium analyses where beliefs are endogenous; we show that an experiment-based approach helps to understand and overcome these difficulties.
Methods Matter: p-Hacking and Publication Bias in Causal Analysis in Economics: Comment
Author：
Sebastian Kranz, Peter Pütz
Abstract：
Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes (2020) study hypothesis tests from economic articles and find evidence for p-hacking and publication bias, in particular for instrumental variable and difference-in-difference studies. When adjusting for rounding errors (introducing a novel method), statistical evidence for p-hacking from randomization tests and caliper tests at the 5 percent significance threshold vanishes for difference-in-difference studies but remains for instrumental variable studies. Results at the 1 percent and 10 percent significance thresholds remain largely similar. In addition, Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes derive latent distributions of z-statistics absent publication bias using two different approaches. We establish for each approach a result that challenges its applicability.
Methods Matter: p-Hacking and Publication Bias in Causal Analysis in Economics: Reply
Author：
Abel Brodeur, Nikolai Cook, Anthony Heyes
Abstract：
In Brodeur, Cook, and Heyes (2020) we present evidence that instrumental variable (and to a lesser extent difference-in-difference) articles are more p-hacked than randomized controlled trial and regression discontinuity design articles. We also find no evidence that (i) articles published in the top five journals are different; (ii) the "revise and resubmit" process mitigates the problem; (iii) things are improving through time. Kranz and Pütz (2022) apply a novel adjustment to address rounding errors. They successfully replicate our results with the exception of our shakiest finding: after adjusting for rounding errors, bunching of test statistics for difference-in-difference articles is now smaller around the 5 percent level (and coincidentally larger at the 10 percent level).
