211高校教授发表顶刊UTD

摘要

We study two competing firms’ incentives for demand information sharing and their production timing strategies. One firm adopts routine timing, where her production time is fixed according to her previous product models’ manufacturing time. The other firm uses strategic timing, where his production time can be strategically chosen to occur before, concurrently with, or after that of the routine-timing firm. The firms decide whether to disclose their private demand information and make quantity decisions based on the available demand information, either simultaneously or sequentially. We analyze the optimal production timing decisions for the strategic firm under different information sharing scenarios and find that a pre-emptive move is generally not optimal. We demonstrate that endogenous production timing can create incentives for information sharing and characterize the conditions under which both firms share information, one firm shares information, or neither firm shares information. Additionally, we uncover several interesting implications of information sharing under endogenous production timing: firms are more likely to share information in intensified competition, a firm may benefit from its rival’s superior information capability, and the option of information sharing enhances social welfare, which may also benefit from more intense competition.

传统理论认为由于需求信息共享会致使竞争对手同向调整企业的运营决策，进而加剧竞争，因而在古诺模型里，企业并不愿与竞争对手进行需求信息共享。但在实践中，竞争企业间的需求信息共享并非罕见。该论文对竞争企业的需求信息共享动机以及生产时机策略间的相互影响展开了探讨。具体来讲，该论文考虑两家竞争企业，其中一家企业运用固定生产时间，其每年的生产时间是固定不变的；另一家企业则采用策略型生产时间，其能够选择在竞争对手之前、同期或者之后进行生产。首先，企业同时决定是否要将自身的需求信息与竞争对手进行共享。其次，策略型企业选择自己的生产时间；最后，企业依据所拥有的需求信息以及生产时间来决定产量水平。该论文的研究表明内生生产时机（endogenous production timing）是竞争企业之间需求信息共享的关键驱动因素，并刻画了不同信息共享状态下的条件。该论文的研究成果可为企业实践和政府政策制定给予理论参考。