Access to IT-Capable employees and the relevance of financial information
具备信息技术能力员工的获取与财务信息相关性
In this paper, we examine IT-capable employees’ role in the production process of financial information. We posit that enhanced management of raw data during this process decreases technical errors and increases data processing speed, thus allowing financial information to be more relevant and, therefore, more useful to the users of financial statements. Since employee characteristics such as IT capability are not observable at the firm level, we utilize US Census Bureau data to create a set of proxies of IT-capable employees at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level. These measures include the percentage of IT graduates relative to the active workforce and IT graduates’ education and income levels. We find that each of our proxies for employee IT capability is associated with lower XBRL extensions and lower earnings announcement lag. Our findings suggest that greater access to IT-capable employees is associated with increased relevance of financial disclosures.
在本文中，我们考察了具备信息技术能力的员工在财务信息生成过程中的作用。我们认为，在该过程中对原始数据进行更高效的管理有助于减少技术性错误并提升数据处理速度，从而增强财务信息的相关性，进而提高财务报表使用者对信息的利用价值。由于员工的信息技术能力等特征在企业层面上难以直接观测，我们利用美国人口普查局的数据，在大都市统计区（MSA）层面构建了一系列具备信息技术能力员工的代理变量。这些衡量指标包括信息技术专业毕业生在劳动力中所占比例、其受教育程度以及收入水平。研究发现，我们所使用的每一项员工信息技术能力代理变量均与较低的XBRL扩展数量和较短的财报发布延迟显著相关。研究结果表明，更高程度地获取具备信息技术能力的员工有助于提高财务信息披露的相关性。
Significant expected lifetime credit loss impairments: Determinants of bank loss recognition and stability implications
重大预期寿命信用损失减值：银行损失确认的决定因素及其对稳定性的影响
This paper explores how a recognition threshold approach for significant expected lifetime credit losses (ELCL) affects the joint surplus of a bank's debtholders and shareholders (bank social value). Banks play a dual role in the economy by supplying credit to the real sector and providing liquidity to depositors. Information released on ELCL induces sound risk-taking in credit supply while potentially distorting the bank's liquidity provision. A recognition threshold for ELCL can balance these social gains and costs by restricting ELCL recognition for a transaction to extreme outcomes. In this balancing act, the recognition threshold enhances a bank's social value by providing sufficient incentives for sound risk-taking while decreasing the social costs of liquidity disruption. Less favorable economic conditions necessitate tighter recognition thresholds to sustain sound risk-taking, which inflates the social costs of liquidity disruption. When these costs become excessive, the balance is disrupted, and forgoing ELCL recognition can enhance the bank's social value. While this practice safeguards stability in the short run, it ultimately undermines it in the long run. From a policy perspective, the results highlight the value of the principle-based notion of IFRS 9's significant increase in credit risk (SICR) criterion to address bank-specific trade-offs and increase a bank's social value. Uniformity of recognition thresholds can be demonstrated for at least a subset of banks. Lastly, the paper emphasizes that a recognition threshold approach does not maximize the social value of a bank, and more complex disclosure rules can further increase it.
本文探讨了“重大预期寿命信用损失”（ELCL）确认阈值方法如何影响银行债权人和股东的联合剩余（即银行的社会价值）。银行在经济中扮演双重角色：一方面向实体部门提供信贷，另一方面为存款人提供流动性。有关ELCL的信息披露能够促进审慎的信贷风险承担，但同时可能扰乱银行的流动性供给。通过将ELCL的确认限定于极端情形，ELCL的确认阈值机制可在上述社会效益与成本之间实现平衡。此种平衡机制通过激励审慎的风险承担并减少流动性中断的社会成本，从而提升银行的社会价值。在经济状况较差的情境下，为维持审慎的风险承担行为，需要更严格的确认阈值，但这也将增加流动性中断的社会成本。当这些成本过高时，平衡机制被打破，此时不确认ELCL反而可能提升银行的社会价值。尽管这一做法在短期内有助于维护金融稳定，但从长期来看却会削弱其稳定性。从政策角度来看，研究结果强调了IFRS 9中“信用风险重大增加”（SICR）判断标准的原则导向价值，其有助于处理银行特有的权衡问题并提升银行的社会价值。至少对部分银行而言，确认阈值的统一性是可行的。最后，本文指出，确认阈值方法并非实现银行社会价值最大化的最佳机制，更为复杂的披露规则可在此基础上进一步提升银行的社会价值。
Skin in the game: Does outside directors’ equity-based compensation induce or mitigate stock price crash risk?
切身利益：外部董事的股权型薪酬是加剧还是缓解股价崩盘风险？
This study examines the relationship between outside directors’ equity-based compensation (DEC) and stock price crash risk using a sample of U.S. firms from 2008 to 2021. We find that DEC is associated with lower crash risk, primarily through its role in reducing over-investment, financial misreporting, and bad news hoarding—suggesting that enhanced director monitoring mitigates key crash risk factors. Subsample analyses reveal that the DEC-crash relationship is more pronounced when monitoring demands are higher, such as with greater information asymmetry, agency costs, audit risk, and transient institutional ownership. The impact of DEC also varies with director attributes, including busyness, gender diversity, and quad-qualification. Overall, our findings highlight that equity pay can align outside directors’ interests with shareholders by strengthening risk oversight, offering insights into optimal compensation contracts and governance mechanisms to mitigate crash risk.
本研究基于2008年至2021年间美国公司的样本，考察了外部董事股权型薪酬（DEC）与股价崩盘风险之间的关系。研究发现，DEC与较低的股价崩盘风险相关，主要通过其在减少过度投资、财务虚报和坏消息隐瞒方面的作用，表明增强的董事监督有助于缓解关键的崩盘风险因素。子样本分析显示，在信息不对称、代理成本、审计风险较高以及机构投资者持股较为短期的情形下，DEC与股价崩盘风险的负相关关系更为显著。DEC的影响还受到董事特征的调节，包括兼职程度、性别多样性以及是否具备四重资格认证。总体而言，研究结果强调，股权型薪酬可以通过强化风险监督，将外部董事的利益与股东利益对齐，为优化薪酬合约与治理机制以缓解崩盘风险提供了重要启示。
Product advertising and financial analyst forecasts
产品广告与财务分析师预测
We examine whether product advertising provides value-relevant information that enables financial analysts to make better earnings and sales forecasts. Our analysis reveals that a firm’s product advertising intensity is positively related to the informativeness and accuracy of analyst forecasts. A difference-in-differences test and an instrumental variable analysis identify the causal relationship. Additionally, the effect of advertising on analyst forecast quality is stronger when a firm has greater coverage from industry-expert analysts, exhibits more volatile operating performance, and holds newly registered trademarks. Overall, our evidence suggests that product advertising conveys valuable information that analysts can utilize to produce higher-quality forecasts for investors, highlighting the role of advertising in a firm’s overall information environment.
我们研究了产品广告是否提供了有价值的信息，从而使财务分析师能够做出更准确的盈利和销售预测。分析结果表明，企业的产品广告强度与分析师预测的信息含量和准确性正相关。通过差异中之差检验（difference-in-differences test）和工具变量分析，我们识别出这种关系的因果性。此外，当企业受到更多行业专家型分析师覆盖、经营业绩更为波动，或拥有新注册的商标时，广告对分析师预测质量的提升作用更为显著。总体而言，我们的证据表明，产品广告传递了分析师可用于提升预测质量的有价值信息，凸显了广告在企业整体信息环境中的作用。
The role of United States boards of accountancy in monitoring and sanctioning CPA Misbehavior
美国注册会计师监管委员会在监督与惩处注册会计师不当行为中的作用
We investigate variation in the attributes of United States (U.S.) Boards of Accountancy across thirty-three states from 2015 to 2018, and how this variation relates to their monitoring and sanctioning activities. We find that state boards vary substantially along several dimensions including the independence and expertise of board members, the gender and racial diversity of the board, the frequency of board meetings, the board’s licensing and continuing professional education (CPE) requirements, and the board’s budget. In addition, we find that these variations are significantly related to the types of disciplinary cases state boards report and the sanctions they impose. Our results provide insights into factors that affect the ability of the accounting profession to effectively self-regulate and that increase the risk of inconsistent monitoring of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) across states.
我们研究了2015年至2018年间美国33个州注册会计师监管委员会（Boards of Accountancy）在属性方面的差异，以及这些差异如何影响其监督与惩处行为。研究发现，各州监管委员会在多个方面存在显著差异，包括委员的独立性与专业能力、性别与种族多样性、会议召开频率、执业许可与继续教育要求以及预算水平。此外，我们发现，这些差异与各州监管委员会报告的纪律处分案件类型及其施加的惩罚措施之间具有显著关系。研究结果揭示了影响会计行业自我监管能力的关键因素，并表明不同州之间对注册会计师（CPA）的监督存在不一致性的风险。
Monitoring incentives and tax planning – Evidence from State-Owned enterprises
监督激励与税收筹划：来自国有企业的证据
This study examines the association between state owners’ monitoring incentives and the tax planning activities of state-owned enterprises. We distinguish between state owners that directly benefit from state-owned enterprises’ income tax payments and those that do not. In our empirical tests, we exploit the variation of state ownership in Germany, making our findings generalizable to other market economies. Our results indicate that state ownership is not associated with less tax planning unless the state owner directly benefits from higher tax payments. We also provide evidence that this effect translates to higher tax revenues at the municipality level. Our results are robust to various specifications and suggest that shareholders’ monitoring incentives are a determinant of a firm’s tax planning activities.
本研究考察了国家所有者的监督激励与国有企业税收筹划活动之间的关系。我们区分了两类国家所有者：一类是能够直接受益于国有企业所得税缴纳的国家所有者，另一类则不具备此项直接利益。在实证分析中，我们利用德国国内国有股权的差异性，使研究结果具有对其他市场经济体的推广价值。研究发现，除非国家所有者能直接从较高的税收缴纳中获益，否则国有股权与较低税收筹划行为之间不存在显著关联。我们还发现，这一效应可在市政层面体现为更高的税收收入。研究结果在多种模型设定下均保持稳健，表明股东的监督激励是影响企业税收筹划行为的重要因素。
Stakeholder orientation and accounting conservatism: Evidence from state-level constituency statutes
利益相关者导向与会计稳健性：来自州级选民法案的证据
We find that the staggered adoption of state-level constituency statutes leads to a significant decrease in accounting conservatism. Constituency statutes allow directors to consider stakeholder interests when making business decisions, thereby increasing firms’ stakeholder orientation. As firms shift attention to stakeholder interests, stakeholders become less concerned about shareholder expropriation and thus demand less conservatism. Cross-sectional analyses show stronger effects for firms with greater agency conflict between shareholders and nonfinancial stakeholders (i.e., customers, suppliers, and employees) and for firms where shareholders and debtholders have lower demand for conservatism. In additional analyses, we find that the adoption of constituency statutes does allow firms to implement corporate policies that are more friendly to their employees, customers, and suppliers. We also show that the effect of constituency statutes on conservatism still holds when the statutes only cover nonfinancial stakeholders (but not debtholders).
我们发现，州级选民法案的分阶段颁布显著降低了企业的会计稳健性。选民法案赋予董事在制定经营决策时考虑利益相关者利益的权利，从而增强了企业的利益相关者导向。随着企业将注意力转向利益相关者，相关方对股东侵占行为的担忧减少，进而降低了对会计稳健性的需求。交叉样本分析显示，在股东与非财务类利益相关者（如客户、供应商和员工）之间代理冲突较大，以及在股东和债权人对稳健性要求较低的企业中，该效应更为显著。进一步分析发现，选民法案的实施确实使企业能够采取更有利于员工、客户和供应商的公司政策。我们还发现，即便选民法案仅涵盖非财务类利益相关者（而不包括债权人），其对会计稳健性的影响依然存在。
Initial evidence on the content and market implications of stablecoin reserve reporting
关于稳定币储备报告内容及其市场影响的初步证据
Stablecoins are cryptocurrencies intended to maintain consistent value against a reference asset (e.g., pegged 1:1 to the US dollar). Their rapid adoption in the absence of federal regulation has raised concerns about the risks they pose to financial markets. In this study, we describe the evolving stablecoin ecosystem and explore the content and market implications of stablecoin reserve reporting. We hand-collect reserve reports issued since 2018 by the largest US dollar-backed stablecoins and develop a transparency index that captures the extent to which disclosures address the sufficiency of issuer assets available for redemption. We find that reserve report transparency varies across stablecoins and over time. Additionally, after enactment of the first state-level reserve report disclosure regulation in 2022, transparency increases for both coins subject and not subject to this regulation. Lastly, despite the relative nascency of the stablecoin marketplace and the reserve report as a disclosure medium, we find that reserve report transparency is associated with greater stablecoin price stability and higher stablecoin adoption (i.e., market capitalization). These effects are pronounced in periods of cryptocurrency market volatility. This early evidence suggests that reserve reporting serves a valuable function in the stablecoin ecosystem.
稳定币是一类旨在将其价值稳定锚定于某一参考资产（如与美元1:1挂钩）的加密货币。其在缺乏联邦监管的背景下迅速普及，引发了人们对其对金融市场潜在风险的担忧。本研究描述了不断演化的稳定币生态系统，并探讨了稳定币储备报告的内容及其市场影响。我们手工收集了自2018年以来由主要美元支持的稳定币发行方发布的储备报告，并构建了一个透明度指数，以衡量信息披露在多大程度上涉及发行方可用于兑付的资产充足性。研究发现，稳定币的储备报告透明度在不同币种及不同时期存在差异。此外，自2022年首个州级储备报告披露监管规定实施以来，不论是否受该规定约束，相关稳定币的透明度均有所提高。最后，尽管稳定币市场仍处于相对早期阶段，且储备报告作为披露手段尚属新兴，我们发现，储备报告透明度与稳定币价格稳定性更强及更高的市场接受度（即市值）显著相关，这一效应在加密货币市场波动期间尤为明显。上述初步证据表明，储备报告在稳定币生态系统中发挥了重要作用。
The real effects of disclosure in going private deals
私有化交易中信息披露的真实效应
Going private transactions have become an area of increasing interest for regulators and policymakers. Disclosures in these transactions are subject to special Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules that require management to provide detailed information to all shareholders before a general vote. We examine the role of disclosure in addressing the frictions between sellers and buyers. We find that disclosure volume is positively associated with the likelihood of closing a deal. However, disclosure volume is also positively related to the intensity of shareholders’ negotiations, which increases the likelihood of shareholder litigation. These findings suggest that disclosure has real effects on the success of going private transactions and highlight the trade-offs that buyers face when determining the volume of disclosure. The results also speak to the extent to which the SEC rules fulfill the regulator’s intent in mandating going private disclosures.
私有化交易日益受到监管机构和政策制定者的关注。在此类交易中，信息披露须遵守美国证券交易委员会（SEC）的特殊规定，要求管理层在召开股东大会投票前向全体股东提供详细信息。本文考察了信息披露在缓解买卖双方摩擦中的作用。研究发现，信息披露数量与交易达成的可能性正相关；然而，信息披露数量同时也与股东谈判强度正相关，从而提高了股东诉讼的可能性。上述发现表明，信息披露对私有化交易的成功具有实际影响，同时突出了买方在确定披露数量时所面临的权衡。此外，研究结果也反映了SEC披露规则在多大程度上实现了监管者设定私有化信息披露要求的初衷。
The spillover effects of accounting scandals in business groups
企业集团中会计丑闻的溢出效应
We show that the revelation of an accounting scandal in a member firm induces stock price declines among other member firms in the same business group. Additional evidence suggests that the spillover effects of accounting scandals are amplified when peer member firms exhibit wider deviation between the ultimate controller’s voting rights and cash flow rights, demonstrate worse accounting transparency, participate more intensively in related party transactions, and appoint more connected audit partners. Further, we find that the spillover effects subside when the peer member firms engage Big Four auditors. We also document that peer member firms that are later identified as committing accounting fraud suffer sharper stock price declines around the revelation of the initial accounting scandal in the business group. Collectively, our evidence implies that an accounting scandal at a member firm undermines the market values of peer member firms by triggering investors’ concerns about accounting fraud risk for these firms.
我们发现，当企业集团中的某一成员公司曝出会计丑闻时，集团内其他成员公司的股价也会出现下跌。进一步的证据表明，当集团内其他成员公司存在更大的控制权与现金流权偏离、会计透明度较差、关联交易较为频繁以及聘用更多具有关系背景的审计合伙人时，会计丑闻的溢出效应更为显著。此外，我们发现，当成员公司聘请四大会计师事务所作为审计机构时，该溢出效应会减弱。我们还记录到，那些随后被发现存在会计欺诈行为的成员公司，在集团最初曝出会计丑闻时，其股价下跌幅度更大。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，成员公司发生的会计丑闻通过引发投资者对集团内其他公司会计欺诈风险的担忧，从而削弱了这些公司的市场价值。
Audit committee governance practices at investment companies: Do they provide substantive oversight?
投资公司审计委员会的治理实践：是否发挥了实质性监督作用？
To study audit committee (AC) governance practices within investment companies’ unique governance environment, we extend corporate governance theory and collect data using a dual-method, three stage research approach. We collect data from a survey of 107 investment company AC members and 38 semi-structured interviews with 20 individuals involved in investment company governance, consisting of ten AC members and ten members of management. Using the survey data, our empirical analysis of governance operations quality (composition and diligence) and governance oversight quality (knowledge of the audit process, investment company risks, and valuation issues) indicates that, consistent with agency theory, ACs play a substantive role, and that management does not significantly influence the quality of these governance areas. Furthermore, the AC chair drives governance operations quality, and the other AC members significantly influence oversight quality. Evidence from the semi-structured interview data provide further supporting evidence for our measures.
为研究投资公司在其独特治理环境下的审计委员会（AC）治理实践，本文扩展了公司治理理论，并采用双重方法、三阶段的研究设计进行数据收集。我们通过问卷调查收集了来自107位投资公司审计委员会成员的回应，并对20位参与投资公司治理的人员（包括10位审计委员会成员和10位管理层成员）进行了38次半结构式访谈。基于问卷数据，我们对治理运作质量（构成与勤勉性）及治理监督质量（对审计流程、投资公司风险及估值问题的了解）展开实证分析，结果表明，符合代理理论预期，审计委员会在治理中发挥了实质性作用，且管理层对上述治理质量并无显著影响。此外，审计委员会主席对治理运作质量起关键推动作用，而其他审计委员会成员则对监督质量产生显著影响。半结构式访谈数据亦为我们所采用的度量指标提供了进一步的支持性证据。
Are climate scenario analysis disclosures valued by investors?
投资者是否重视气候情景分析披露？
Scenario analysis is a well-established management tool for developing and executing organizational strategy. While stress testing (a form of scenario analysis) has been used for policy-making and benchmarking in the banking sector, climate-related scenario analysis is a more recent development. Emergent accounting standards require firms to perform and report on climate scenario analyses. This paper examines whether information about firms’ climate scenarios is valued by financial markets. Relying on voluntary disclosures from US publicly traded firms in the CDP database from 2018 to 2022, we find that firms conducting scenario analyses have higher market valuations, with less positive valuations for firms that incorporate insights from qualitative (not quantitative) scenarios into their strategy. The findings highlight the importance of using scenario analysis to inform strategy and the need for clearer guidance on disclosure practices.
情景分析是一种广泛应用于制定和执行组织战略的管理工具。尽管压力测试（情景分析的一种形式）已被银行业用于政策制定与基准评估，但与气候相关的情景分析仍属新兴发展。当前，新兴会计准则要求企业开展并披露气候情景分析。本文考察了企业气候情景分析信息是否被金融市场所重视。基于2018至2022年间美国上市公司在CDP数据库中自愿披露的信息，我们发现开展情景分析的企业具有更高的市场估值，但当企业仅将定性情景分析结果纳入战略制定时，其市场估值提升程度较小。研究结果强调了将情景分析成果纳入战略决策的重要性，并指出亟需就披露实践提供更明确的指引。
Accounting for wrongdoing. The financial consequences of bank misconduct
不当行为的会计处理：银行违规行为的财务后果
This paper investigates the determinants influencing banks’ decisions to disclose P&L misconduct-related charges and assesses the extent to which these P&L charges can predict future misconduct penalty announcements. Previous research has largely focused on the penalty announcements as the primary indicator for the financial consequences of bank misconduct. However, the P&L impact of misconduct is influenced by accounting rules that drive banks to disclose a provision or cost ahead of the announcement of a future penalty. Using a sample of hand collected data for Global Systemically Important Banks, we establish that disclosure of misconduct provisions is primarily determined by accounting standards. We also demonstrate that misconduct provisions are accrued prior to a penalty being announced and provide advance indication of the amount of forthcoming penalties. While misconduct provisions, when available, could be considered the optimal measure of misconduct, the empirical evidence shows that their disclosure is limited. On the other hand, banks often make known their misconduct-related P&L costs on their quarterly financial documents. These disclosures are frequent, comprehensive and pervasive across different accounting standards, with expected penalty size as the primary determinant of their disclosure. P&L misconduct costs also share the forward-looking nature of provisions. This implies that, when P&L misconduct related costs are disclosed, markets react accordingly, anticipating a future penalty. Our research provides the first analysis of the accounting elements of bank misconduct, the interaction between misconduct disclosures and penalty announcements and the influence of these disclosures on stock returns.
本文研究了影响银行披露与损益表相关的不当行为费用（P&L misconduct-related charges）决策的因素，并评估此类费用在多大程度上能够预测未来的违规罚款公告。以往研究主要聚焦于罚款公告作为衡量银行违规行为财务后果的核心指标，然而，违规行为对损益的影响受会计准则所驱动，银行往往需在未来罚款公告之前预先计提准备或确认费用。基于全球系统重要性银行的手工收集数据，我们发现，违规准备金的披露主要受会计准则决定。研究还表明，银行在正式公布罚款之前便已计提相关违规准备金，这些准备金可对未来罚款金额提供前瞻性信号。尽管违规准备金可被视为衡量银行违规行为的最优指标，但实证证据显示其披露仍较为有限。相较之下，银行更常在季度财务文件中披露与违规相关的损益费用，这类披露在不同会计准则下普遍存在，且其发生主要取决于预期罚款规模。此外，与准备金类似，这些损益费用同样具有前瞻性特征，意味着一旦银行披露相关费用，市场便会做出反应，预期未来将有罚款产生。本研究首次系统分析了银行违规行为的会计处理机制、违规披露与罚款公告之间的关系，以及相关披露对股票回报的影响。
Creditor governance and mandatory information disclosure quality
债权人治理与强制性信息披露质量
We examine how the information disclosure quality of mandatory disclosure changes in response to the strength of creditor governance. Creditor governance is more prominent after debt covenant violations when banks use control rights to influence firm policies. We find that the complexity of firms’ 10-K filings increases after debt covenant violations. Our cross-sectional analyses show that the change in complexity varies systematically with the strength of creditor influence and creditors’ incentive to obscure public information disclosure. Further tests show that the increased reporting complexity is detrimental to firm value and firm’s information environment. Our study demonstrates that creditor governance plays a crucial role in shaping the quality of mandatory information disclosure. We contribute to the literature by examining the impact of creditor governance on firm behavior.
我们研究了在债权人治理强度变化的背景下，企业强制性信息披露质量如何发生变化。债权人治理在企业违反债务契约后变得更加显著，此时银行通过行使控制权来影响企业决策。研究发现，在债务契约违约后，企业10-K报告的复杂性显著上升。横截面分析进一步表明，信息披露复杂性的变化系统性地取决于债权人影响力的强弱以及其掩盖公共信息披露的动机。进一步的实证检验显示，披露复杂性的增加对企业价值及其信息环境具有负面影响。本文表明，债权人治理在塑造强制性信息披露质量方面发挥着关键作用，并通过揭示债权人治理对企业行为的影响，丰富了相关文献。
Press freedom and stock price crash risk
新闻自由与股价崩盘风险
This paper examines the impact of press freedom, an important institutional factor, on stock price crash risk. Using a large international sample of firms across 52 economies between 2002 and 2021, we find that firms in economies with higher degrees of press freedom are associated with lower levels of future stock price crash risk. Our analysis further shows that press freedom helps to deter the hoarding of bad news by increasing the intensity of reporting, extending the reporting period, and broadening local media coverage. Firms operating in economies with press freedom demonstrate stronger corporate governance and lower levels of firm-specific and long-term overvaluation, which are likely mechanisms through which press freedom mitigates crash risk. The negative impact of press freedom on crash risk is weakened by corruption but strengthened for firms facing higher short interest and less analyst coverage. Additional tests reveal that this negative relationship is driven by a collective influence from multiple dimensions of press freedom. Our results survive a battery of robustness checks. In sum, our findings suggest that press freedom enhances the stability of the global stock market by discouraging the concealment of negative information.
本文研究了新闻自由这一重要制度性因素对股价崩盘风险的影响。基于2002年至2021年间涵盖52个经济体的大型国际企业样本，我们发现，在新闻自由程度较高的经济体中，企业未来的股价崩盘风险显著较低。进一步分析表明，新闻自由通过增强报道强度、延长报道周期以及扩大本地媒体覆盖范围，抑制了企业对坏消息的隐瞒行为。在新闻自由环境中运营的企业展现出更强的公司治理水平，以及更低的公司特异性和长期高估值程度，这些机制可能是新闻自由降低崩盘风险的路径。我们还发现，腐败会削弱新闻自由对崩盘风险的负面影响，而在面临更高空头压力和分析师覆盖度较低的企业中，该影响则更为显著。额外检验显示，这一负相关关系源于新闻自由多个维度的共同作用。研究结果在多项稳健性检验下依然成立。综上所述，我们的研究表明，新闻自由通过抑制负面信息的隐瞒行为，有助于提升全球股市的稳定性。
The information content of managers' climate risk disclosure: Evidence from conference calls
管理者气候风险披露的信息含量：来自电话会议的证据
We explore the determinants of voluntary disclosures about climate risks made by managers during earnings conference calls, and examine whether these disclosures provide decision-useful information to investors. Using a sample of more than 70,000 conference-call transcripts from 2005-2020 with over 6,000 disclosures related to climate risk events, we find that disclosure is more common for smaller firms with higher but more volatile performance. We also show that firms often bundle climate risk disclosures with bad news about earnings in conference calls that are longer and have a more negative tone. Controlling for earnings news and firm fixed effects, we find a negative stock price reaction to climate risk disclosures in conference calls, but we also find that these disclosures are positively associated with abnormal trading volume, suggesting investors have different beliefs about how to incorporate them. Finally, we find that the negative stock price reaction to bad news about earnings is less pronounced when managers provide climate risk disclosures. Overall, our results provide evidence on when managers make climate risk disclosures in conference calls and how investors react, and are consistent with regulators' proposals for more specific guidance on the form and content of such disclosures.
我们研究了管理者在财报电话会议中自愿披露气候风险信息的动因，并考察此类披露是否为投资者提供了有助于决策的信息。基于2005年至2020年间超过70,000份电话会议记录及其中6,000余条与气候风险事件相关的披露，我们发现，规模较小且业绩水平较高但波动性更大的企业更倾向于进行气候风险披露。我们还发现，企业常在电话会议中将气候风险信息与负面的盈利消息一并披露，此类会议往往更冗长，且语气更为消极。在控制了盈利信息与企业固定效应后，我们发现气候风险披露与股票价格负向反应相关，但也观察到其与异常交易量正相关，表明投资者在如何解读此类信息上存在分歧。最后，我们发现，当管理层在电话会议中披露气候风险信息时，盈利负面消息所引发的股价下跌反应趋于缓和。总体而言，研究结果揭示了管理者在何种情况下进行气候风险信息披露，以及投资者如何作出反应，支持监管机构关于气候信息披露形式和内容提出更明确指引的建议。
Personal liability and independent directors: Evidence from China
个人法律责任与独立董事：来自中国的证据
The debate over strengthening independent directors’ personal liability to enhance their governance role continues, with concerns it may lead to increased resignations. Existing research has left gaps in understanding the legislative effects of increasing this responsibility and its heterogeneity across different contexts, especially in rapidly growing emerging markets. Our study bridges this gap by investigating how increased personal liability influences independent director turnover and corporate governance efficiency following the amendment of China’s Securities Law. We argue that these amendments signify the end of lax penalties for independent directors, thereby boosting corporate governance. Using a dataset of Chinese listed firms spanning 2017 to 2021, we observe a significant increase in independent director resignations post-amendments. This effect is more prominent in firms with higher litigation risk, more opaque information, higher internal corruption, and lower independent director remuneration. Independent directors who are weakly independent, are frequently absent, use proxy voting, hold multiple independent directorships, live far from the firms they serve, or have academic backgrounds are more likely to resign when facing increased personal liability. Further analysis reveals that the resignation of independent directors who are weakly independent, live far from the firm, and hold multiple independent directorships after the amendment is positively associated with stock returns. Additionally, the increased personal liability introduced by the amendment improves corporate governance efficiency. These findings provide new insights into governance reforms in emerging markets and the general role of diligent independent directors.
关于加强独立董事个人法律责任以提升其治理作用的讨论仍在持续，尽管这一改革可能引发独立董事离职率上升的担忧。现有研究在理解此类责任强化的立法效果及其在不同制度背景下的异质性方面仍存在不足，尤其是在快速发展的新兴市场中。本文通过研究中国《证券法》修订后，增加个人法律责任如何影响独立董事离职及公司治理效率，以弥补这一研究空白。我们认为，该修法标志着对独立董事宽松问责时代的终结，有助于强化公司治理。基于2017至2021年中国上市公司的数据，我们发现，在修法之后，独立董事辞职显著增加，且这一效应在高诉讼风险、信息不透明、内部腐败严重以及独立董事薪酬较低的公司中更为显著。那些独立性较弱、缺勤频繁、使用授权投票、兼任多个独董职位、居住地远离所服务公司或具有学术背景的独立董事，在面临更高法律责任时更倾向于辞职。进一步分析显示，修法后，独立性较弱、居住地较远及兼任多个独董职位的董事辞职，与公司股票回报呈正相关。此外，修法所引入的更高个人责任水平提升了公司治理效率。上述发现为理解新兴市场的治理改革以及勤勉尽责的独立董事在公司治理中的普遍作用提供了新的视角。
Key audit matters as insights into auditors’ professional judgement: Evidence from the European Union
关键审计事项作为审计师专业判断的体现：来自欧盟的证据
The European Union (EU) Regulation 537/2014 introduced the mandatory disclosure of Key Audit Matters (KAMs) within an auditor’s report, with the aim of increasing the informational value of these reports. Extant research, however, shows contrasting results as to whether KAM disclosure is providing relevant information to stakeholders. Moreover, concerns have been raised about unintended consequences from KAM disclosure, with respect to the process that leads to the issuance of the audit report. Using a sample of 6,164 firm-year observations for the period 2017–2021, related to 1,660 unique firms listed in all EU Member States, we find that the number of KAMs is positively associated with audit fees, audit report lags and the probability that an opinion different from the standard unqualified opinion is issued. Moreover, we document that both KAMs related to entity-level and account-level risks are positively associated with audit fees, whereas only entity-level KAMs drive the positive association with audit report lags and the issuance of a modified opinion. Our research speaks directly to EU legislators, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, and any other regulators around the globe that have mandated the disclosure of KAMs within audit reports.
欧洲联盟（EU）第537/2014号法规要求审计报告中强制披露关键审计事项（Key Audit Matters，KAMs），旨在提升审计报告的信息价值。然而，现有研究对于KAM披露是否为利益相关者提供了有价值的信息存在分歧。此外，学界和实务界也对KAM披露在审计报告出具过程中可能引发的意外后果表示担忧。本文基于2017年至2021年间欧盟各成员国共1,660家上市公司的6,164个公司年度观测值，发现KAM数量与审计费用、审计报告滞后时间以及出具非标准无保留意见的可能性正相关。此外，我们进一步发现，无论是涉及公司层面风险还是账户层面风险的KAM，均与审计费用正相关；但仅公司层面的KAM推动了审计报告滞后时间的延长以及修改意见的出具。我们的研究成果直接回应了欧盟立法者、国际审计与鉴证准则理事会（IAASB）、美国上市公司会计监督委员会（PCAOB）以及全球其他已实施KAM披露要求的监管机构的关注。
How does auditor planning materiality affect audit pricing of fair values and external valuation?
审计师计划重要性如何影响公允价值与外部估值的审计定价？
In response to regulatory calls for research on materiality judgements and regulators discovering shortcomings in the audit of fair values, we provide the first empirical evidence on the impact of auditor planning materiality for fair value assets on the audit. Auditing standards require auditors to plan the audit considering the materiality of accounts based on both qualitative (i.e., nature of the account) and quantitative thresholds. The inherently risky, complex, and subjective nature of fair value assets render them a prime candidate to examine how auditor materiality judgments affect the audit. We also consider how external valuation of fair value assets affects the audit. We situate our study in the Australian real estate industry because fair value assets comprise the majority of assets in this industry. Using extensive hand-collected data spanning 2010 to 2020, our findings show that fair values below the quantitative materiality threshold of 10% are not related to audit fees. However, when fair value asset accounts are at least at the 10% threshold, they are positively associated with audit fees. In addition, we find that external valuation of fair value assets reduces the impact of material fair values on audit fees. Taken together, a primary implication of our results for regulators and policy makers, the audit profession, and literature is that auditors appear to be emphasizing quantitative materiality over qualitative materiality considerations even for accounts where qualitative considerations are warranted. Moreover, auditors also are relying on external valuations in their audit of material fair value assets, which raises implications for relying on the work of non-auditor specialists.
为回应监管机构对重要性判断研究的呼吁，以及在公允价值审计中发现的缺陷，本文首次提供了关于审计师在计划阶段对公允价值资产重要性判断对审计影响的实证证据。审计准则要求审计师在审计计划中同时考虑账户的重要性，包括定性因素（如账户性质）与定量阈值。公允价值资产具有高风险、复杂性和主观性等特征，是研究审计师重要性判断如何影响审计工作的理想对象。我们还考察了外部估值在公允价值审计中的作用。本文以澳大利亚房地产行业为研究背景，因为该行业的资产主要以公允价值计量。基于2010年至2020年间的大量手工收集数据，我们发现，当公允价值资产低于10%的定量重要性阈值时，其与审计费用无显著关系；而当其达到或超过10%时，则与审计费用显著正相关。此外，外部估值在一定程度上减弱了重大公允价值资产对审计费用的影响。总体而言，本文的研究结果对监管机构、政策制定者、审计行业及学术研究具有重要启示：即便在需要考虑定性因素的情境下，审计师似乎仍更加侧重于定量重要性判断；同时，审计师对重大公允价值资产的审计依赖外部估值结果，也引发了对非审计专业人员工作可依赖性的进一步思考。
The impact of capping the SALT deduction on municipal bond pricing
限制州和地方税（SALT）扣除对市政债券定价的影响
Using California county-level data, we show that municipal bond yields became less sensitive to local real estate tax revenues following the cap on state and local tax (SALT) deductions imposed by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). This effect is more pronounced in counties where taxpayers were less likely to support future tax increases and in counties with fewer financial constraints. Additionally, we find that voter support for local tax ballot proposals declined upon enactment of the TCJA. Our findings suggest that the TCJA heightened uncertainty around counties’ ability to collect local property taxes which, in turn, influenced the pricing of municipal securities.
基于加利福尼亚州县级数据，我们发现，《减税与就业法案》（TCJA）实施后对州和地方税（SALT）扣除设限，使市政债券收益率对地方房地产税收入的敏感性下降。这一效应在两个类型的县中更为显著：一是纳税人较不可能支持未来加税的县，二是财政约束较少的县。此外，我们还发现，TCJA颁布后，选民对地方税收提案的支持度有所下降。研究结果表明，TCJA加剧了市场对地方政府征收房地产税能力的不确定性，从而影响了市政债券的定价。
