1、大型机构投资者的细粒度性质
The Granular Nature of Large Institutional Investors
大型机构投资者在美国股票市场的份额越来越大。这种发展对金融市场的影响尚不清楚。本文提出了新的经验证据，表明大型机构的所有权预示着股票价格的更高波动性和更大噪音以及危机时期更大的脆弱性。在顺着这个思路研究时，我们发现大型机构投资者表现出粒度特征（即公司内的子单位表现出相关行为），这减少了异质冲击的多样化。因此，大型机构的交易量更大，并导致更大的价格影响。
Large institutional investors own an increasing share of the equity markets in the United States. The implications of this development for financial markets are still unclear. The paper presents novel empirical evidence that ownership by large institutions predicts higher volatility and greater noise in stock prices as well as greater fragility in times of crisis. When studying the channel, we find that large institutional investors exhibit traits of granularity (i.e., subunits within a firm display correlated behavior), which reduces diversification of idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, large institutions trade larger volumes and induce greater price impact.
论文原文：Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni, Rabih Moussawi, John Sedunov (2021) The Granular Nature of Large Institutional Investors. Management Science 67(11):6629-6659.
2、场外衍生品的歧视性定价
Discriminatory Pricing of Over-the-Counter Derivatives
新的监管数据首次允许精确衡量外汇衍生品市场中针对非金融客户的价格歧视。与理论文献一致，交易成本随着客户成熟度的衡量而系统地变化。中位数客户支付的费用中位数比蓝筹公司高 10.9 个点，因为其复杂程度较低，而样本平均有效点差为 6.9 个点。然而，当客户在多经销商平台上进行电子交易时，价格歧视就完全消除了。我们还记录了不太成熟的客户在与其关系银行和快速变化的市场进行交易时会产生额外费用，但这仅限于双边谈判合同。
For the first time, new regulatory data allow precise measurement of price discrimination against nonfinancial clients in the foreign exchange derivatives market. Consistent with the theoretical literature, transaction costs vary systematically with measures of client sophistication. The median client pays 10.9 pips more than blue-chip companies because of its lower level of sophistication, which compares with a sample average effective spread of 6.9 pips. However, price discrimination is fully eliminated when clients trade electronically on multidealer platforms. We also document that less sophisticated clients incur additional costs when trading with their relationship bank and in fast-moving markets, but only for bilaterally negotiated contracts.
论文原文：Harald Hau, Peter Hoffmann, Sam Langfield, Yannick Timmer (2021) Discriminatory Pricing of Over-the-Counter Derivatives. Management Science 67(11):6660-6677.
3、为什么完美的测试可能不值得等待：作为商品的信息
Why Perfect Tests May Not Be Worth Waiting For: Information as a Commodity
信息产品为代理提供可用于更新操作的附加信息。在许多情况下，对此类产品的访问可能非常有限。例如，在流行病中，医疗检测试剂盒或测试的供应往往有限。这些测试是信息产品，因为它们的肯定或否定答案的输出可以告知个人和当局有关基础状态和适当的行动方案。在本文中，我们使用分析模型展示了检测底层状态的测试准确性如何影响异构代理之间对信息产品的需求差异。相应地，测试精度可以作为一种配给装置，以确保将有限的信息产品供应适当地分配给异构代理。当测试可用性较低并且社会规划者无法以有针对性的方式将测试分配给代理时，我们发现中等良好的测试在社会结果方面可以胜过完美的测试。
Information products provide agents with additional information that can be used to update actions. In many situations, access to such products can be quite limited. For instance, in epidemics, there tends to be a limited supply of medical testing kits, or tests. These tests are information products because their output of a positive or a negative answer informs individuals and authorities on the underlying state and the appropriate course of action. In this paper, using an analytical model, we show how the accuracy of a test in detecting the underlying state affects the demand for the information product differentially across heterogeneous agents. Correspondingly, the test accuracy can serve as a rationing device to ensure that the limited supply of information products is appropriately allocated to the heterogeneous agents. When test availability is low and the social planner is unable to allocate tests in a targeted manner to the agents, we find that moderately good tests can outperform perfect tests in terms of social outcome.
论文原文：K. Drakopoulos, R. S. Randhawa (2021) Why Perfect Tests May Not Be Worth Waiting For: Information as a Commodity. Management Science 67(11):6678-6693.
4、平衡试验
Experimenting in Equilibrium
实验设计的经典方法假设干预一个单元不会影响其他单元。然而，在许多重要环境中，这种不干涉假设并不成立，例如在拼车平台上对供应方激励措施或能源市场中的补贴进行实验时。在本文中，我们在具有相当大的跨单元干扰的大规模随机系统中引入了一种新的实验设计方法，假设干扰的结构足以通过平均场建模来捕获它。我们的方法使我们能够通过将不显眼的随机化与轻量级建模相结合，准确估计系统参数的微小变化的影响，同时保持平衡。然后我们可以使用这些估计通过梯度下降来优化系统。具体而言，我们专注于寻求在集中市场中优化供应方支付 p 的平台问题，在该市场中，不同供应商通过其对整体供需平衡的影响进行交互，并且我们表明我们的方法使平台能够优化 p在使用极小扰动的大型系统中。
Classical approaches to experimental design assume that intervening on one unit does not affect other units. There are many important settings, however, where this noninterference assumption does not hold, as when running experiments on supply-side incentives on a ride-sharing platform or subsidies in an energy marketplace. In this paper, we introduce a new approach to experimental design in large-scale stochastic systems with considerable cross-unit interference, under an assumption that the interference is structured enough that it can be captured via mean-field modeling. Our approach enables us to accurately estimate the effect of small changes to system parameters by combining unobtrusive randomization with lightweight modeling, all while remaining in equilibrium. We can then use these estimates to optimize the system by gradient descent. Concretely, we focus on the problem of a platform that seeks to optimize supply-side payments p in a centralized marketplace where different suppliers interact via their effects on the overall supply-demand equilibrium, and we show that our approach enables the platform to optimize p in large systems using vanishingly small perturbations.
论文原文：Stefan Wager, Kuang Xu (2021) Experimenting in Equilibrium. Management Science 67(11):6694-6715.
5、净计量分布式可再生能源：公用事业的危险？
Net-Metered Distributed Renewable Energy: A Peril for Utilities?
电力终端用户越来越多地通过屋顶太阳能电池板发电。我们研究了这种分布式可再生能源 (DRE) 在净计量下对公用事业利润和社会福利的影响，这是美国的一项普遍政策。公用事业公司一直在游说反对净计量分布式太阳能，因为人们普遍认为它会损害公用事业利润。我们发现，当考虑批发市场动态时，净计量 DRE 可能对公用事业公司有利。也就是说，当公用事业的自供电低于阈值并且批发电价对批发需求波动有足够的反应时，净计量 DRE 严格提高了预期的公用事业利润。我们的论文特别考虑了净计量 DRE 对公用事业的下游和上游影响，并分析了这些影响之间的权衡。净计量 DRE 会增加公用事业的费用，因为它们需要从产生的客户中进行回购，并减少其零售收入。此外，它还可以降低公用事业的批发采购成本或影响其批发市场收入。我们的结果表明，公用事业公司可能会受益于激励客户安装太阳能电池板的新兴商业战略。我们的数值研究使用加利福尼亚分布式太阳能和加利福尼亚独立系统运营商运营的批发电力市场的数据，并证明我们的研究结果在现实参数下成立。
Electricity end-users have been increasingly generating their own electricity via rooftop solar panels. We study the impact of such distributed renewable energy (DRE) on utility profits and social welfare under net metering, which is a widespread policy in the United States. Utilities have been lobbying against net-metered distributed solar based on the common belief that it harms utility profits. We find that when wholesale market dynamics are considered, net-metered DRE may be a positive for utilities. That is, net-metered DRE strictly improves the expected utility profit when the utility's self-supply is below a threshold and the wholesale electricity price is sufficiently responsive to wholesale demand fluctuations. Our paper distinctively considers both downstream and upstream impacts of net-metered DRE on utilities and analyzes the tradeoff between these impacts. Net-metered DRE can increase utilities' expenses because of their required buyback from generating customers, and reduces their retail sales revenues. In addition, it can either reduce utilities' wholesale procurement costs or affect their wholesale market revenues. Our results suggest that utilities might benefit from emerging business strategies that motivate their customers to install solar panels. Our numerical study uses data on the distributed solar in California and the wholesale electricity market operated by the California Independent System Operator, and demonstrates that our findings hold under realistic parameters.
论文原文：Nur Sunar, Jayashankar M. Swaminathan (2021) Net-Metered Distributed Renewable Energy: A Peril for Utilities?. Management Science 67(11):6716-6733.
6、播种羊群：社会学习操纵的定价和福利效应
Seeding the Herd: Pricing and Welfare Effects of Social Learning Manipulation
这篇论文的动机是最近出现的试图操纵社交学习的卖家采用的各种干扰策略。我们重新审视观察社会学习的经典模型并将其扩展到允许（i）卖家和消费者之间关于产品价值的不对称信息以及（ii）卖家通过虚假购买“播种”观察学习过程的能力，企图操纵消费者的信念。我们研究了社会学习操纵与均衡市场结果之间的相互作用，以及旨在检测和惩罚不当行为的反操纵措施的影响。分析得出三个主要见解。首先，我们表明增加反操纵措施的强度可能会产生意想不到的后果，通常会导致更高水平的操纵以及更高的均衡价格。其次，我们发现尽管高强度措施可以完全阻止不当行为，但与没有措施的情况相比，此类措施不会导致卖方或消费者收益的任何改善。第三，我们证明在许多情况下，中等强度的措施可以利用卖方操纵同时提高卖方和消费者的收益。
This paper is motivated by the recent emergence of various interference tactics employed by sellers attempting to manipulate social learning. We revisit the classic model of observational social learning and extend it to allow for (i) asymmetric information on product value between the seller and the consumers and (ii) the ability of the seller to "seed" the observational learning process with a fake purchase, in an attempt to manipulate consumer beliefs. We examine the interaction between social learning manipulation and equilibrium market outcomes as well as the impact of antimanipulation measures aimed at detecting and punishing misconduct. The analysis yields three main insights. First, we show that increasing the intensity of antimanipulation measures can have unintended consequences, often inducing higher levels of manipulation as well as higher equilibrium prices. Second, we find that although measures of high intensity can completely deter misconduct, such measures do not lead to any improvement in either seller or consumer payoffs, relative to the case where no measures are present. Third, we demonstrate that in many cases, measures of intermediate intensity can leverage seller manipulation to simultaneously improve both seller and consumer payoffs.
论文原文：Li Chen, Yiangos Papanastasiou (2021) Seeding the Herd: Pricing and Welfare Effects of Social Learning Manipulation. Management Science 67(11):6734-6750.
7、使命召唤：连锁餐厅的即时排班
Call to Duty: Just-in-Time Scheduling in a Restaurant Chain
即时调度在服务行业中已经无处不在。尽管在降低人员配备水平方面有效，从而降低了劳动力成本，但准时制调度对工人生产力和公司收入的潜在影响尚不清楚。我们使用来自美国一家提供全方位服务的休闲餐饮连锁店的 25 家门店的 1,444,044 笔交易的数据集，研究了准时制安排如何影响员工生产力。我们考虑两种类型的及时调度：（1）在服务日前不久（在我们的数据中主要是两天）分配给服务器的短通知调度和（2）分配给服务器的实时调度服务当天的服务器。我们表明，短期通知计划不会损害整体服务器生产力，但实时计划会降低 4.4%。我们的分析表明，这可能是因为服务器在按实时时间表工作时减少了向上销售和交叉销售的努力。然后，我们提出了一个分析调度模型，该模型考虑了通过即时调度创造的人员配备灵活性的价值及其对服务器生产力的影响，以告知公司如何使用即时调度来提高盈利能力。通过案例研究，我们证明了在实时调度期间生产力损失 4.4%，管理人员应该从大量使用实时调度转向以更长时间提前通知调度更多服务器。这种转变不仅为工人提供了更可预测的工作时间表，而且还可以将餐厅的预期利润提高多达 1%，这对于低利润的餐饮业来说是一个很大的数字。
Just-in-time scheduling has become ubiquitous in the service industries. Although effective in reducing staffing level, hence labor cost, the potential impact of just-in-time scheduling on workers' productivity and the firm's revenue is not well understood. Using a data set of 1,444,044 transactions from 25 stores of a full-service casual dining restaurant chain in the United States, we study how just-in-time scheduling impacts worker productivity. We consider two types of just-in-time schedules: (1) short-notice schedules that are assigned to servers shortly before the day of service (mostly two days in our data) and (2) real-time schedules that are assigned to servers on the day of service. We show that short-notice schedules do not harm server productivity overall, but real-time schedules do by 4.4%. Our analysis indicates this may be because servers reduce their up-selling and cross-selling efforts when working on real-time schedules. We then propose an analytical scheduling model that accounts for both the value of staffing flexibility created through just-in-time scheduling and its impact on server productivity to inform the firm how to use just-in-time scheduling to improve profitability. Through a case study, we demonstrate that with the 4.4% productivity loss during the real-time schedules, the managers should shift from the heavy use of real-time scheduling toward scheduling more servers with longer advance notice. Such a shift not only provides more predictable work schedules for the workers but can also improve restaurants' expected profit by up to 1%, a significant number for the low-margin restaurant industry.
论文原文：Masoud Kamalahmadi, Qiuping Yu, Yong-Pin Zhou (2021) Call to Duty: Just-in-Time Scheduling in a Restaurant Chain. Management Science 67(11):6751-6781.
8、租赁、模块化和循环经济
Leasing, Modularity, and the Circular Economy
我们调查了联合实施租赁和模块化的经济和环境影响、两个突出的循环经济战略及其相互作用。我们开发了一个耐用品模型，以获得考虑使用这些策略的公司的见解。我们首先分析采用租赁对公司产品架构选择的影响。我们发现，模块化产品架构只有在租赁产品贬值幅度更大的情况下才会在租赁下更具吸引力。我们接下来分析采用模块化产品架构对公司商业模式选择的影响。我们发现采用模块化架构可以导致租赁公司转为销售，但不会导致销售公司转为租赁。基于这些结果，我们表明，只有在有限的条件下（即，当生产成本较低，非租赁产品处于相对较好的状态，并且当折旧水平之间存在很大差异时，公司才会倾向于租赁模块化产品不同的模块）。最后，我们表明，与单独采用租赁或模块化相比，联合实施租赁和模块化也会导致更高的环境影响。
We investigate the economic and environmental implications of jointly implementing leasing and modularity, two prominent circular economy strategies, and their interaction. We develop a durable goods model to obtain insights for firms considering the use of these strategies. We first analyze the effect of adopting leasing on a firm's product architecture choice. We find that a modular product architecture is more attractive under leasing only if off-lease products depreciate to a greater extent. We next analyze the effect of adopting a modular product architecture on the firm's business model choice. We find that adopting a modular architecture can cause a leasing firm to switch to selling but will not lead a selling firm to switch to leasing. Building on these results, we show that leasing a modular product is preferred by the firm only under limited conditions (i.e., when production costs are low, off-lease products are in relatively better condition, and when there is a large difference between depreciation levels of different modules). Finally, we show that jointly implementing leasing and modularity can also lead to higher environmental impact than only adopting leasing or modularity in isolation.
论文原文：Vishal Agrawal, Atalay Atasu, Sezer Ülkü (2021) Leasing, Modularity, and the Circular Economy. Management Science 67(11):6782-6802.
9、一个排队黄牛模型
A Model of Queue Scalping
近年来，在易拥塞的服务系统中，排队黄牛不断兴起。排队黄牛对主要服务没有实质性兴趣，而是主动进入队列，希望稍后出售他的位置。本文开发了排队黄牛博弈理论模型，并产生了以下见解。首先，我们发现需求量非常小或非常大的队列可能不受黄牛的影响，而需求量非极端的队列可能会吸引最多的黄牛。其次，在短期内，当容量固定时，排队抢购的存在往往会增加社会福利，可以增加或减少系统吞吐量，但往往会减少消费者剩余。第三，从长远来看，排队黄牛的存在促使福利最大化服务提供者使用“拉到中心”规则调整容量，如果原始容量水平低（高），则增加（减少）容量。当服务提供商通过扩大容量来应对时，排队抢购的存在从长远来看可以提高社会福利、系统吞吐量甚至消费者剩余，从而扭转其对客户的短期不利影响。尽管有这些潜在的好处，但这种容量扩张对缓解黄牛几乎没有作用，而且可能只会在队列中产生更多的黄牛。最后，我们将排队黄牛与实践中的其他常见机制进行比较和对比，即（集中式）优先付费、排队和回调。
Recent years have witnessed the rise of queue scalping in congestion-prone service systems. A queue scalper has no material interest in the primary service but proactively enters the queue in hopes of selling his spot later. This paper develops a queueing-game-theoretic model of queue scalping and generates the following insights. First, we find that queues with either a very small or very large demand volume may be immune to scalping, whereas queues with a nonextreme demand volume may attract the most scalpers. Second, in the short run, when capacity is fixed, the presence of queue scalping often increases social welfare and can increase or reduce system throughput, but it tends to reduce consumer surplus. Third, in the long run, the presence of queue scalping motivates a welfare-maximizing service provider to adjust capacity using a "pull-to-center" rule, increasing (respectively, reducing) capacity if the original capacity level is low (respectively, high). When the service provider responds by expanding capacity, the presence of queue scalping can increase social welfare, system throughput, and even consumer surplus in the long run, reversing its short-run detrimental effect on customers. Despite these potential benefits, such capacity expansion does little to mitigate scalping and may only generate more scalpers in the queue. Finally, we compare and contrast queue scalping with other common mechanisms in practice-namely, (centralized) pay-for-priority, line sitting, and callbacks.
论文原文：Luyi Yang, Zhongbin Wang, Shiliang Cui (2021) A Model of Queue Scalping. Management Science 67(11):6803-6821.
10、供应链和反垄断治
Supply Chains and Antitrust Governance
反垄断法规旨在促进市场公平竞争，但当涉及多层供应链时，很难平衡行政和法律成本与执法成本。这一挑战的典型例子是具有里程碑意义的伊利诺伊州砖块裁决，该裁决将反垄断损害赔偿仅限于产品的直接购买者；例如，消费者可以对串通的零售商提出反垄断索赔，但不能对串通的制造商提出反垄断索赔——只有零售商才能对制造商提出索赔。这项有争议的裁决旨在降低法律成本，但显然会导致错失执法机会。在本文中，我们展示了伊利诺伊州砖块裁决如何与供应链中采用的合同相互作用，并且我们展示了其他等效的供应链安排可能会产生明显不同的影响。特别是，我们发现批发价、最低订购量、收益分享和数量折扣合同导致零售商在发生串通行为时对制造商采取法律行动。然而，批发价加固定费用的合同结构（也称为两部分关税或进场费合同）促进了制造商与零售商之间的勾结，零售商通过固定费用获得补偿而不提起反垄断诉讼。我们进一步证明，在零售层面的高度需求不确定性和高度竞争下，串通更有可能发生，但在制造商层面的高度竞争下则不太可能发生。我们的论文帮助公共执法者识别有利于违反反垄断法的市场条件。
Antitrust regulations are meant to promote fair competition in the market, but balancing administrative and legal costs with enforcement can be difficult when multilayered supply chains are involved. The canonical example of this challenge is the landmark Illinois Brick ruling, which limits antitrust damages to only the direct purchasers of a product; for instance, consumers can file antitrust claims against colluding retailers but not against colluding manufacturers-only retailers can file claims against manufacturers. This controversial ruling was meant to reduce legal costs, but it can clearly lead to missed enforcement opportunities. In this paper, we demonstrate how the Illinois Brick ruling interacts with contracts adopted in the supply chain, and we show that otherwise equivalent supply chain arrangements can have markedly different effects. In particular, we find that wholesale price, minimum order quantity, revenue sharing, and quantity discount contracts lead retailers to take legal action against manufacturers in the event of collusive behavior. However, the wholesale price plus fixed fee contract structure (also known as a two-part tariff or slotting fee contract) facilitates collusion among the manufacturers with retailers compensated by the fixed fee and not filing the antitrust litigation. We further demonstrate that collusion is more likely under high demand uncertainty and high competition at the retail level but is less likely under high competition at the manufacturer level. Our paper helps public enforcers identify market conditions conducive to antitrust violations.
论文原文：Nitish Jain, Sameer Hasija, Serguei Netessine (2021) Supply Chains and Antitrust Governance. Management Science 67(11):6822-6838.
11、农作物最低支持价格的价值和成本：农民和消费者的福利和实施成本
The Value and Cost of Crop Minimum Support Price: Farmer and Consumer Welfare and Implementation Cost
在许多发展中国家，农作物最低支持价格 (MSP) 是一项补贴计划，旨在 (i) 通过保障农民收入免受农作物价格波动的影响来改善农民福利，以及 (ii) 通过确保充足的农作物产量来提高消费者剩余。在实施 MSP 计划的不同机制中，我们专注于基于信用的 MSP，如果现行市场价格低于预先指定的 MSP，政府会向农民提供信贷。通过考虑 MSP 的实施成本，我们从净收益（即农民剩余减去实施成本）和净社会价值（即农民和消费者剩余总和减去实施成本）来检验 MSP 的有效性。在一个由具有异质生产成本的厌恶风险的农民组成的市场中。此外，农民面临两种类型的不确定性：（1）市场和（2）产量不确定性。我们发现基于信用的 MSP 可以诱导农作物生产，这是直观的。然而，我们发现了一些更有趣的结果：(i) 提供更高的 MSP 可能不会提高农民的剩余，(ii) MSP 的净收益可能是负的——提供 MSP 的成本可能超过农民的剩余，以及 (iii) 存在使净社会价值最大化的 MSP。我们将我们的单一农作物模型扩展到两种农作物的情况，以捕捉间作 MSP 相互作用。我们表明，当一种农作物比另一种农作物更有价值但风险更大时，则为两种农作物中的一种提供适当的 MSP 而对另一种农作物不提供 MSP 就足够了。
In many developing countries, crop minimum support price (MSP) is a subsidy scheme to (i) improve farmer welfare by safeguarding farmers' incomes against vagaries in crop price and (ii) improve consumer surplus by ensuring sufficient crop production. Among different mechanisms to operationalize an MSP scheme, we focus on credit-based MSPs under which the government credits farmers should the prevailing market price be below the prespecified MSP. By accounting for the implementation cost of the MSP, we examine the effectiveness of the MSP in terms of net benefit (i.e., farmer's surplus minus the implementation cost) and net social value (i.e., sum of farmer's and consumer's surpluses minus the implementation cost) in a market that consists of risk-averse farmers with heterogeneous production costs. Also, farmers face two types of uncertainties: (1) market and (2) production yield uncertainty. We find that a credit-based MSP can induce crop production, which is intuitive. However, we find some more interesting results: (i) offering a higher MSP may not improve farmer's surplus, (ii) the net benefit of an MSP can be negative-the cost of offering an MSP can exceed the farmer's surplus, and (iii) there exists an MSP that maximizes the net social value. We extend our single-crop model to the case of two crops to capture the intercrop MSP interaction. We show that when one crop is more rewarding but riskier than the other crop, then it is sufficient to offer an appropriate MSP for one of the two crops while offering no MSP to the other crop.
论文原文：Prashant Chintapalli, Christopher S. Tang (2021) The Value and Cost of Crop Minimum Support Price: Farmer and Consumer Welfare and Implementation Cost. Management Science 67(11):6839-6861.
12、双边市场的最优增长
Optimal Growth in Two-Sided Markets
我们开发了双边市场最优增长的理论模型。该模型假定市场产出（交易数量）是供求存量的函数。该市场产出是使用同质生产函数建模的，该函数可以具有递增或递减的规模报酬。供需库存水平遵循一个增长模型，在该模型中，每个时间点的增长率是市场每一方收到的盈余和供需消耗（供需生命周期）的函数。盈余可以通过改变支付给卖方的价格和向买方收取的价格在市场的两侧进行分配，我们假设平台控制。通过这些价格杠杆，平台可以向市场的一方或双方支付补贴。我们研究了最优市场增长的行为，包括市场变得自我维持的点和市场的长期最优规模。随着市场规模的增长，我们描述了供需之间的最佳平衡，并确定了最大化贴现总利润的最佳补贴政策。对于没有价格约束的收益递增和递减的情况，我们展示了最佳政策是利用补贴支出的冲动（补贴冲击）使市场立即移动到其最佳长期规模来增长。这一结果与在许多双边市场（如拼车）中观察到的增长竞争是一致的。
We develop a theoretical model of optimal growth in two-sided markets. The model posits that market output (number of transactions) is a function of the stock of supply and demand. This market output is modeled using a homogeneous production function, which can have increasing or decreasing returns to scale. The supply and demand stock levels follow a growth model in which the rate of growth at each point in time is a function of both the surplus each side of the market receives and the attrition of supply and demand (supply and demand lifetimes). The surplus can be apportioned between the two sides of the market by changing the price paid to sellers and the price charged to buyers, which we assume the platform controls. Through these price levers, the platform can pay subsidies to one or both sides of the market. We investigate the behavior of optimal market growth, including the point at which the market becomes self-sustaining and the long-run optimal size of the market. We characterize the optimal balance between supply and demand as the market size grows and determine optimal subsidy policies that maximize discounted total profit. For the case of both increasing and decreasing returns without price constraints, we show the optimal policy is to grow using an impulse of subsidy spending (a subsidy shock) to move the market immediately to its optimal long-run size. This result is consistent with the race to growth observed in many two-sided markets like ride-sharing.
论文原文：Zhen Lian, Garrett van Ryzin (2021) Optimal Growth in Two-Sided Markets. Management Science 67(11):6862-6879.
13、跟随我的脚步：自信的廉价谈话和性别差距
Follow My Lead: Assertive Cheap Talk and the Gender Gap
一个人的成功往往取决于其他人是否相信他们所说的话。越来越多的证据表明，与男性相比，人们不太可能相信女性发表的言论。我们考虑自信的廉价谈话（一种重要且广泛使用的提高可信度的工具）是否是这种性别差距的一种机制。如果女性因自信的廉价谈话而面临负面回报，那么她们就无法获得提高可信度的有效工具。我们在遵循建议的环境中使用实验室实验和在线复制提供证据，两者都具有实际风险。我们研究了自信的廉价谈话是否会影响建议的遵循，受试者是否会根据顾问的性别进行歧视，以及自信的廉价谈话是否存在不同性别的差异回报。受试者被随机分配到一个看不见的男性或女性团队领导者，他们在其他方面是相同的，并且被分配到领导者的不同类型的规定的、越来越自信的书面交流中。自信的语言显着增加了对建议的遵循，但我们没有发现性别歧视的证据。我们还发现，尽管受试者认为这种语言更具阳刚之气，但自信的语言对男性和女性领导者都有积极的回报。然而，女性受试者仍然不太可能选择自我宣传的语言。因此，即使在没有歧视的情况下，这种选择也会减少对女性提供的建议的遵守，从而产生性别差距。更多地使用自信的语言可能是女性增加她们在劳动力市场上的影响力的有效策略。
A person's success often depends on whether others believe what they say. Growing evidence suggests that people are less likely to believe statements made by women rather than men. We consider whether assertive cheap talk, an important and widely used tool for increasing credibility, is a mechanism for this gender gap. If women face negative returns to assertive cheap talk, then they have less access to an effective tool for increasing their credibility. We provide evidence using a laboratory experiment and an online replication, both with real stakes, in an advice-following setting. We study whether assertive cheap talk affects advice following, whether subjects discriminate based on advisor gender, and whether there are differential returns to assertive cheap talk by gender. Subjects were randomly assigned to an unseen male or female team leader who were otherwise identical and to different types of prescripted, increasingly assertive written communication from the leader. Assertive language significantly increased advice following, but we find no evidence for gender discrimination. We also find that assertive language had positive returns for both male and female leaders, despite subjects perceiving this language as more masculine. However, female subjects were still less likely to choose the self-promotional language. Thus, even in the absence of discrimination, this choice would reduce adherence to advice provided by women, generating a gender gap. Greater use of assertive language could be an effective strategy for women to increase their influence and in the labor market.
论文原文：Shanthi Manian, Ketki Sheth (2021) Follow My Lead: Assertive Cheap Talk and the Gender Gap. Management Science 67(11):6880-6896.
14、重温 Ellsberg 和 Machina 的悖论：歧义下的两阶段评估模型
Revisiting Ellsberg's and Machina's Paradoxes: A Two-Stage Evaluation Model Under Ambiguity
在本文中，提出了一种用于歧义下决策的两阶段评估（TSE）模型。状态空间中的事件分为风险事件和模糊事件，它们对应于不同来源产生的不同类型的不确定性。在该 TSE 模型中，决策者 (DM) 在不同阶段评估两种不同类型的不确定性。在第一阶段，DM 通过应用局部主观预期效用 (SEU) 模型在局部评估行为的更多不确定后果，然后将这些模型嵌入到基于对所有事件全局定义的 SEU 的第二阶段评估中。为了使这样的模型公理化，针对风险行为的小域 SEU 被扩展到风险和非风险（模糊）行为。在评估一个风险行为时，TSE 模型简化为一个阶段的 Savage 的 SEU。在评估模棱两可的行为时，对模棱两可的事件定义不同的不确定性厌恶的本地 SEU 使 TSE 模型在描述偏好方面具有一定的灵活性。可以证明，TSE 模型可以容纳文献中的 Ellsberg 悖论和 Machina 悖论。当应用于投资组合选择问题时，TSE 模型具有其他模型所没有的一些很好的特性。
In this paper, a two-stage evaluation (TSE) model for decision making under ambiguity is proposed. Events in state space are classified into risky and ambiguous events, which correspond to different types of uncertainty generated by different sources. In this TSE model, uncertainty of two different types are evaluated by decision maker (DM) in different stages. In the first stage, DM evaluates more uncertain consequences of an act locally by applying local subjective expected utility (SEU) models, which are then embedded into the second-stage evaluation based on SEU defined globally over all events. To axiomatize such a model, the small domain SEU over risky acts is extended to both risky and nonrisky (ambiguous) acts. When evaluating a risky act, TSE model reduces to Savage's SEU with one stage. When evaluating an ambiguous act, local SEU with a different uncertainty aversion defined on ambiguous events gives TSE model some flexibility in describing preferences. It can be shown that TSE model can accommodate Ellsberg's paradoxes and Machina's paradoxes in the literature. When applied to portfolio selection problem, TSE model enjoys some nice properties other models do not have.
论文原文：Ying He (2021) Revisiting Ellsberg’s and Machina’s Paradoxes: A Two-Stage Evaluation Model Under Ambiguity. Management Science 67(11):6897-6914.
15、依赖顺序的 Luce 模型
The Order-Dependent Luce Model
我开发了一个包含顺序效应的简单公理模型：备选方案的排序（例如，大学排名、杂货店中产品的位置、选票上候选人的顺序）影响选择频率。在我的模型中，选择替代方案的概率与替代方案的效用成正比，类似于 Luce 模型。但是，备选方案的效用取决于菜单中备选方案的相对顺序。我通过 Luce 的无关选择独立公理的两个弱点来描述这个模型。我讨论了如何在没有观察到的情况下从选择数据中确定备选方案的顺序。最后，我将我的模型应用于最优排序问题和跨期选择的实验数据。
I develop a simple axiomatic model that incorporates the order effect: the ordering of alternatives (e.g., ranking of universities, the location of products in a grocery store, the order of candidates on a ballot) affects choice frequencies. In my model, the probability of choosing an alternative is proportional to the utility of the alternative, similar to the Luce model. However, the utility of the alternative depends on the relative ordering of the alternative in the menu. I characterize this model by two weakenings of Luce's axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives. I discuss how to identify the ordering of alternatives from choice data when it is not observed. Finally, I apply my model to an optimal ordering problem and to experimental data on intertemporal choice.
论文原文：Gerelt Tserenjigmid (2021) The Order-Dependent Luce Model. Management Science 67(11):6915-6933.
16、经验决策中的先验信念和模棱两可的态度
Prior Beliefs and Ambiguity Attitudes in Decision from Experience
先验信念及其更新在不确定性下的决策中起着至关重要的作用，关于它们的理论在经典贝叶斯主义中已经建立。然而，对于从经验中做出的模棱两可的决定，它们几乎不存在。本文提出了一种新的决策模型，该模型将先验信念的作用（超越歧义态度的作用）纳入此类决策的分析中。因此，它将经济学中流行的歧义理论与经验决策（心理学中流行（主要））联系起来，使两者都受益。对来自经验决策文献的一些现有数据集的重新分析表明，将先验信念纳入主观概率估计的模型优于常用的模型，该模型用观察到的相对频率来近似主观概率。控制主观先验，我们获得了对歧义态度的更准确测量，从而对描述决策与经验决策之间的差距提供了新的解释。
Prior beliefs and their updating play a crucial role in decisions under uncertainty, and theories about them have been well established in classical Bayesianism. Yet, they are almost absent for ambiguous decisions from experience. This paper proposes a new decision model that incorporates the role of prior beliefs, beyond the role of ambiguity attitudes, into the analysis of such decisions. Hence, it connects ambiguity theories, popular in economics, with decision from experience, popular (mostly) in psychology, to the benefit of both. A reanalysis of some existing data sets from the literature on decisions from experience shows that the model that incorporates prior beliefs into the estimation of subjective probabilities outperforms the commonly used model that approximates subjective probabilities with observed relative frequencies. Controlling for subjective priors, we obtain more accurate measurements of ambiguity attitudes, and thus a new explanation of the gap between decision from description and decision from experience.
论文原文：Ilke Aydogan (2021) Prior Beliefs and Ambiguity Attitudes in Decision from Experience. Management Science 67(11):6934-6945.
17、两种交易经济的实验比较：长期资产与短期资产
An Experimental Comparison of Two Exchange Economies: Long-Lived Asset vs. Short-Lived Asset
卢卡斯树模型 [Lucas RE Jr (1978) 交换经济中的资产价格。Econometrica 46(6):1429-1445.] 是现代宏观金融的核心。它的核心是分析交换经济中长期资产的均衡价格，其中消费是目标，资产的唯一目的是随着时间的推移平滑消费。该模型的实验测试使用 Lucas 模型的特定实例。在这里，我们采用与前两个不同的实例，将他们的分析从两周期振荡世界扩展到三周期周期性世界；这部分是为了测试他们结果的稳健性。我们还更进一步，将这种解决方案（与消费平滑问题）进行了比较，其中消费索赔通过长期资产进行交易，与市场提供的替代解决方案相比，代理人可以直接进行交易（短期）期间之间的消费索赔。我们发现后一种交换经济在鼓励消费平滑方面比具有长期资产的经济更有效。我们在两个市场都发现了缺乏竞争性交易的证据。
The Lucas tree model [Lucas RE Jr (1978) Asset prices in an exchange economy. Econometrica 46(6):1429-1445.] lies at the heart of modern macrofinance. At its core, it provides an analysis of the equilibrium price of a long-lived asset in an exchange economy where consumption is the objective and the sole purpose of the asset is to smooth consumption through time. Experimental tests of the model use a particular instantiation of the Lucas model. Here we adopt a different instantiation to the first two, extending their analyses from a two-period oscillating world to a three-period cyclical world; this is partly to test the robustness of their results. We also go one step further and compare this solution (to a consumption-smoothing problem), in which consumption claims are traded via the longlived asset, with the alternative solution provided by a market, in which agents can directly trade (short-lived) consumption claims between periods. We find that the latter exchange economy is more efficient in encouraging consumption smoothing than the economy with the long-lived asset. We find evidence of uncompetitive trading in both markets.
论文原文：Enrica Carbone, John Hey, Tibor Neugebauer (2021) An Experimental Comparison of Two Exchange Economies: Long-Lived Asset vs. Short-Lived Asset. Management Science 67(11):6946-6962.
18、同龄人性别对商学院专业选择的影响
The Effect of Peer Gender on Major Choice in Business School
商学学位很受欢迎，可以带来高收入。然而，女商科毕业生的收入低于男毕业生。这些性别差异可以追溯到大学，在那里女性回避金融等高收入专业。在本文中，我们调查了商学院同龄人的性别构成如何影响女性和男性的主要选择和劳动力市场结果。我们发现，被随机分配到女性同龄人较多的教学部门的女性不太可能选择金融等男性主导的专业，而更有可能选择市场营销等女性主导的专业。毕业后，这些女性最终从事收入增长较慢的工作。另一方面，当男性在商学院有更多女性同龄人时，男性更可能选择男性主导的专业，而不太可能选择女性主导的专业。然而，男性的劳动力市场结果并未受到显着影响。综上所述，我们的结果表明，在商学院与更多女性同龄人一起学习会增加教育选择中的性别隔离并影响劳动力市场结果。
Business degrees are popular and lead to high earnings. Female business graduates, however, earn less than their male counterparts. These gender differences can be traced back to university, where women shy away from majors like finance that lead to high earnings. In this paper, we investigate how the gender composition of peers in business school affects women’s and men’s major choices and labor market outcomes. We find that women who are randomly assigned to teaching sections with more female peers become less likely to choose male-dominated majors like finance and more likely to choose female-dominated majors like marketing. After graduation, these women end up in jobs where their earnings grow more slowly. Men, on the other hand, become more likely to choose male-dominated majors and less likely to choose female-dominated majors when they had more female peers in business school. However, men’s labor market outcomes are not significantly affected. Taken together, our results show that studying with more female peers in business school increases gender segregation in educational choice and affects labor market outcomes.
论文原文：Ulf Zölitz, Jan Feld (2021) The Effect of Peer Gender on Major Choice in Business School. Management Science 67(11):6963-6979.
19、为什么要加入团队？
Why Join a Team?
我们展示了一些实验，探讨为什么在没有短期经济利益的情况下，高能力员工会加入能力较差同事的团队。我们区分了两种解释：亲社会偏好和通过教导未来的队友而预期的长期经济收益。参与者执行一项真正努力的任务，并决定是独立工作还是加入一个两人团队。待遇因支付方案（计件费或收入分成）、队友是否可以交流以及教学的作用而异。高能力员工在没有收入共享的情况下更愿意加入团队，而在无法沟通时则不太愿意加入团队。当沟通成为可能时，选择高能力员工加入团队的驱动因素是预期未来从教学中获得的经济收益，而不是某种亲社会偏好。这一结果对于逆向选择在决定团队生产力方面的作用具有重要意义。
We present experiments exploring why high ability workers join teams with less able coworkers when there are no short-term financial benefits. We distinguish between two explanations: prosocial preferences and expected long-term financial gains from teaching future teammates. Participants perform a real-effort task and decide whether to work independently or join a two-person team. Treatments vary the payment scheme (piece rate or revenue sharing), whether teammates can communicate, and the role of teaching. High ability workers are more willing to join teams in the absence of revenue sharing and less willing to join teams when they cannot communicate. When communication is possible, the choice of high ability workers to join teams is driven by expected future financial gains from teaching rather than some variety of prosocial preferences. This result has important implications for the role of adverse selection in determining the productivity of teams.
论文原文：David J. Cooper, Krista Saral, Marie Claire Villeval (2021) Why Join a Team?. Management Science 67(11):6980-6997.
20、来自零售链的绩效薪酬和先前的学习证据
Performance Pay and Prior Learning-Evidence from a Retail Chain
我们报告了零售连锁店的两个现场实验的结果，并表明绩效薪酬的有效性关键取决于先前的工作经验。引入基于销售的绩效薪酬首先是区域经理，然后是商店经理，我们发现平均处理效果可以忽略不计。通过调查和访谈，我们开发了一个正式的模型，证明绩效工资的影响随着经验的增加而降低，甚至可能在极限内消失。我们提供了符合这一假设的经验证据——例如，在工作经验低的商店中（仅）发现积极的治疗效果。
We report the results of two field experiments in a retail chain and show that the effectiveness of performance pay crucially hinges on prior job experience. Introducing sales-based performance pay first for district managers and later for store managers, we find negligible average treatment effects. From surveys and interviews, we develop a formal model demonstrating that the effect of performance pay decreases with experience and may even vanish in the limit. We provide empirical evidence in line with this hypothesis-for instance, finding positive treatment effects (only) in stores with low job experience.
论文原文：Kathrin Manthei, Dirk Sliwka, Timo Vogelsang (2021) Performance Pay and Prior Learning—Evidence from a Retail Chain. Management Science 67(11):6998-7022.
21、新产品的评级、评论和营销
Ratings, Reviews, and the Marketing of New Products
我们研究有关新产品的用户生成内容 (UGC) 如何影响公司的广告和定价决策以及对利润和市场动态的影响。我们构建了一个两期模型，其中消费者重视质量并且他们对新产品定位的品味是异质的，并检查跨代的三种信息传递结构：无信息（基准）、平均评分（AR）和评分的联合分布和品尝地点（评论）。首先，我们表明，在 AR 案例中，公司向较小的消费者群做广告，并且价格相对于其他案例更高。之所以发生这种情况，是因为公司有动机战略性地使用广告来提高第一代的平均评级，以提高第二代的质量感知。该公司收取较高的第一期价格，因为广告面向的是距离产品所在地相对较近的消费者。其次，我们发现随着越来越多的信息跨代传递，随着时间的推移，平均评分显示出增加的模式的可能性更大。发生这种情况是因为通过评论，第二代消费者除了产品质量之外，还能够根据产品的定位做出购买决定。有趣的是，由于公司在 AR 案例中的广告策略更窄，而在评论案例中更丰富的 UGC，平均评分将随着时间的推移呈现逆转：第一期 AR 案例更高，而第二期评论案例更高.第三，公司的预期利润可能与 UGC 转移的数量呈现非单调关系：如果广告的边际回报很高（例如，当广告执行成本低，消费者对产品适合度或消费者非常看重质量），但在广告回报低的评论案例中最高。然后，我们研究了第二代消费者通过与第一代买家的社交互动了解产品的设置。我们发现广告和社会传染相互作用：随着同质性的增加，即当更可能具有相似偏好的消费者之间发生社会互动时，公司通常有更大的动机做广告。但是，这种模式可以通过评论逆转。本文讨论了几种稳健性检查和模型扩展，并通过强调结果的管理含义来总结。
We study how user-generated content (UGC) about new products impacts a firm's advertising and pricing decisions and the effect on profits and market dynamics. We construct a two-period model where consumers value quality and are heterogeneous in their taste for the new product's positioning and examine three information-transfer structures across generations: no information (benchmark), average rating (AR), and the joint distribution of ratings and taste locations (reviews). First, we show that in the AR case, the firm advertises to a smaller set of consumers and prices higher relative to the other cases. This occurs because the firm has an incentive to use advertising strategically to bump up the first-generation average rating in order to increase second-generation quality perceptions. The firm charges a higher first-period price as consumers who are relatively close to the product's location are advertised to. Second, we find that as more information is transferred across generations, there is a greater likelihood that average ratings will exhibit an increasing pattern over time. This happens because with reviews, second generation consumers are able to base purchase decisions on the product's positioning in addition to its quality. Interestingly, because of the firm's narrower advertising strategy in the AR case and the richer UGC in the reviews case, average ratings will exhibit a reversal over time: higher in the AR case in the first period but higher in the reviews case in the second period. Third, a firm's expected profits can exhibit a nonmonotonic relationship with respect to the amount of UGC transferred: highest in the AR case if the marginal return on advertising is high (e.g., when advertising is cheap to execute, consumers are insensitive to product fit or consumers greatly value quality) but highest in the reviews case when the return on advertising is low. We then examine a setup whereby second generation consumers become aware of the product through social interaction with first-generation buyers. We find that advertising and social contagion interact: the firm generally has a greater incentive to advertise as homophily increases, that is, as social interactions occur between consumers who more likely share similar preferences. However, this pattern can reverse with reviews. This paper discusses several robustness checks and model extensions and concludes by highlighting the managerial implications of the results.
论文原文：Itay P. Fainmesser, Dominique Olié Lauga, Elie Ofek (2021) Ratings, Reviews, and the Marketing of New Products. Management Science 67(11):7023-7045.
22、销售队伍管理的综合效应：选拔、薪酬和培训的动态结构分析
The Comprehensive Effects of Sales Force Management: A Dynamic Structural Analysis of Selection, Compensation, and Training
本研究提供了一个全面的代理行为模型，以响应多种销售管理工具，包括薪酬、招聘/终止和培训。该模型考虑了构成现实销售队伍设置的许多关键要素：努力分配、前瞻性行为、当前偏见、培训有效性以及员工选择和流失。通过了解这些因素如何共同影响代理商的行为，该研究为销售管理政策的优化设计提供了指导。现场验证，通过比较新政策下的反事实和实际结果，证明了模型的准确性。结果表明，在调整固定薪酬和可变薪酬之间存在权衡；销售培训如何替代薪酬；雇用高绩效、经验丰富的销售人员的潜在缺点；以及如何利用休假计划导致销售人员重组。此外，该研究通过提供双曲线时间偏好的正式识别条件，提供了关键的方法论贡献。识别的关键是在多期非线性激励系统下，代理人与目标的接近程度仅影响非金钱利益期的未来收益，对当前收益提供排除限制。
This study provides a comprehensive model of an agent's behavior in response to multiple sales management instruments, including compensation, recruiting/ termination, and training. The model takes into account many of the key elements that constitute a realistic sales force setting: allocation of effort, forward-looking behavior, present bias, training effectiveness, and employee selection and attrition. By understanding how these elements jointly affect agents' behavior, the study provides guidance on the optimal design of sales management policies. A field validation, by comparing counterfactual and actual outcomes under a new policy, attests to the accuracy of the model. The results demonstrate a tradeoff between adjusting fixed and variable pay; how sales training serves as an alternative to compensation; a potential drawback of hiring high-performing, experienced salespeople; and how utilizing a leave package leads to sales force restructuring. In addition, the study offers a key methodological contribution by providing formal identification conditions for hyperbolic time preference. The key to identification is that under a multiperiod nonlinear incentive system, an agent's proximity to a goal affects only future payoffs in nonpecuniary benefit periods, providing exclusion restrictions on the current payoff.
论文原文：Doug J. Chung, Byungyeon Kim, Byoung G. Park (2021) The Comprehensive Effects of Sales Force Management: A Dynamic Structural Analysis of Selection, Compensation, and Training. Management Science 67(11):7046-7074.
23、补偿在线内容生产者：理论分析
Compensating Online Content Producers: A Theoretical Analysis
数字内容行业正在迅速发展，许多平台托管了大量由独立制作人制作的内容。这些平台的主要收入来源是广告。但是，广告收入取决于访问平台并享受内容制作者创建的内容的活跃客户数量。因此，各大平台为内容生产者提供激励，鼓励高质量的内容创作。一种常用的激励措施是广告收益分享。在本文中，我们研究了这种共享激励如何受到不同生产商之间竞争性质、客户群规模和客户类型的影响。我们还研究了对利润和福利的影响，并将分析扩展到考虑平台允许消费者直接向生产者捐款的情况。我们的结果表明，生产者竞争的加剧可以为生产者带来更高的报酬、更高的内容质量和更高的生产者利润。我们还表明，允许消费者向生产者捐款可以带来更高的佣金率和更优质的内容。然而，消费者慷慨度的提高可能会导致内容制作者的利润降低。此外，我们发现生产者之间的不对称有时会使平台受益。
The digital content industry is rapidly growing, and many platforms host a vast amount of content that is produced by independent producers. A major source of revenue for these platforms is advertising. However, advertising revenue depends on the number of active customers who visit the platform and enjoy content created by content producers. Therefore, major platforms provide incentives for content producers to encourage high-quality content creation. A commonly used incentive is ad revenue sharing. In this paper, we study how such sharing incentives are affected by the nature of competition among various producers, the size of customer base, and the type of customers. We also examine the implications for profits and welfare and extend the analysis to consider the case when the platform allows consumers to directly donate to the producers. Our results show that increased producer competition can lead to higher compensation for the producers, higher content quality, and higher producers' profits. We also show that allowing consumers to donate to producers can lead to a higher commission rate and better-quality content. However, increased consumer generosity may lead to lower profits for content producers. In addition, we find that asymmetry among producers can sometimes benefit the platform.
论文原文：Sanjay Jain, Kun Qian (2021) Compensating Online Content Producers: A Theoretical Analysis. Management Science 67(11):7075-7090.
24、社会学习和太阳能光伏应用
Social Learning and Solar Photovoltaic Adoption
越来越多的文献指出，利用社会互动和推动促进亲社会行为的采用是有效的。本研究调查了一项旨在积极利用社会学习和同伴互动来鼓励采用住宅太阳能光伏系统的大规模行为干预。市政当局选择提供团体定价的太阳能安装商，并开展由志愿者大使推动的信息宣传活动。我们发现运动中每个城市有 37 个装置的因果处理效果，并且没有收获或持久性的证据。干预还降低了安装价格。基于干预的随机对照试验表明，选择项目很重要，而团体定价则不然。我们的结果表明，该计划提供了规模经济并降低了消费者获取成本，从而实现了低成本的减排。
Growing literature points to the effectiveness of leveraging social interactions and nudges to spur adoption of prosocial behaviors. This study investigates a large-scale behavioral intervention designed to actively leverage social learning and peer interactions to encourage adoption of residential solar photovoltaic systems. Municipalities choose a solar installer offering group pricing and undertake an informational campaign driven by volunteer ambassadors. We find a causal treatment effect of 37 installations per municipality from the campaigns and no evidence of harvesting or persistence. The intervention also lowers installation prices. Randomized controlled trials based on the intervention show that selection into the program is important, whereas group pricing is not. Our results suggest that the program provided economies of scale and lowered consumer acquisition costs, leading to low-cost emission reductions.
论文原文：Kenneth T. Gillingham, Bryan Bollinger (2021) Social Learning and Solar Photovoltaic Adoption. Management Science 67(11):7091-7112.
25、 凸风险函数的逆优化
Inverse Optimization of Convex Risk Functions
凸风险函数理论现在已经被很好地确立为确定应该在风险规避优化问题中使用的风险函数族的基础。尽管具有理论上的吸引力，凸风险函数的实施仍然很困难，因为关于如何选择凸风险函数以便它也能很好地代表决策者的主观风险偏好几乎没有指导。在本文中，我们通过逆优化的视角来解决这个问题。具体来说，给定来自一些（前向）风险规避优化问题（即具有已知约束的风险最小化问题）的解决方案数据，我们开发了一个逆向优化框架，该框架生成一个风险函数，使解决方案对前向问题进行优化。该框架结合了凸风险函数的众所周知的特性——即单调性、凸性、平移不变性和律不变性——作为关于候选风险函数的一般信息，以及来自个人的反馈——其中包括对风险的初始估计随机损失之间的函数和成对比较 - 作为更具体的信息。我们的框架特别新颖，与经典的逆优化不同，它不需要对风险函数进行任何参数假设（即，它是非参数的）。我们展示了如何将由此产生的逆优化问题重新表述为凸程序，并且如果相应的前向问题是多项式可解的，那么它是多项式可解的。我们说明了投资组合选择问题中的估算风险函数，并使用现实数据证明了它们的实用价值。
The theory of convex risk functions has now been well established as the basis for identifying the families of risk functions that should be used in risk-averse optimization problems. Despite its theoretical appeal, the implementation of a convex risk function remains difficult, because there is little guidance regarding how a convex risk function should be chosen so that it also well represents a decision maker's subjective risk preference. In this paper, we address this issue through the lens of inverse optimization. Specifically, given solution data from some (forward) risk-averse optimization problem (i.e., a risk minimization problem with known constraints), we develop an inverse optimization framework that generates a risk function that renders the solutions optimal for the forward problem. The framework incorporates the well-known properties of convex risk functions-namely, monotonicity, convexity, translation invariance, and law invariance-as the general information about candidate risk functions, as well as feedback from individuals-which include an initial estimate of the risk function and pairwise comparisons among random losses-as the more specific information. Our framework is particularly novel in that unlike classical inverse optimization, it does not require making any parametric assumption about the risk function (i.e., it is nonparametric). We show how the resulting inverse optimization problems can be reformulated as convex programs and are polynomially solvable if the corresponding forward problems are polynomially solvable. We illustrate the imputed risk functions in a portfolio selection problem and demonstrate their practical value using real-life data.
论文原文：Jonathan Yu-Meng Li (2021) Inverse Optimization of Convex Risk Functions. Management Science 67(11):7113-7141.
26、中国的报纸审查：来自隧道丑闻的证据
Newspaper Censorship in China: Evidence from Tunneling Scandals
媒体传播在促进价格发现方面发挥着重要作用。限制媒体传播的政治压力会阻碍这一功能并影响投资者的看法。本文以隧道丑闻为背景，研究了中国报纸审查的规模及其经济后果。我们发现了在国家和地方层面对隧道相关的负面新闻进行审查的重要证据。我们进一步表明，在审查中幸存下来的新闻可以减少信息不对称并提高定价效率。审查阻止了信息性的隧道新闻，并延迟了将隧道报告纳入价格。
Media dissemination plays an important role in facilitating price discovery. Political pressure that restricts media dissemination can hinder this function and affect investors’ perceptions. This paper studies the magnitude of newspaper censorship in China and its economic consequences using a setting of tunneling scandals. We find significant evidence of censorship of tunneling-related negative news at the national and local levels. We further show that news that survives censorship reduces information asymmetry and improves pricing efficiency. Censorship blocks informative tunneling news and delays incorporation of tunneling reporting into prices.
论文原文：Ole-Kristian Hope, Yi Li, Qiliang Liu, Han Wu (2021) Newspaper Censorship in China: Evidence from Tunneling Scandals. Management Science 67(11):7142-7166.
27、分解的销售和库存回报
Disaggregated Sales and Stock Returns
使用来自美国大型金融机构的交易级信用卡支出，我们表明分解的销售提供了与公司股票定价相关的客户需求的准确和持续信号。在控制收益和销售意外后，公司财政季度调整后的客户支出每增加一个五分位，导致 60 天的收益公告后累积异常回报增加 1.5 个百分点。可预测性集中在面向消费者的公司，尤其是那些更多依赖间接销售渠道的公司。我们还发现高 FICO 分数、高流动性和忠诚客户对支出的回报反应更强烈。分解后的销售信息传递速度比收益信息慢，小企业或远离终端客户的企业价格反应滞后。最后，调整后的客户支出的回报影响延伸到生产链上的公司。
Using transaction-level credit-card spending from a large U.S. financial institution, we show that disaggregated sales provide accurate and persistent signals of customer demand relevant to a firm's stock pricing. After controlling for earnings and sales surprises, one interquintile increase in the adjusted customer spending during a firm's fiscal quarter leads to a 1.5 percentage point increase in the 60-day post-earnings announcement cumulative abnormal return. The predictability concentrates in consumeroriented firms, especially those relying more on indirect sales distribution channels. We also find a stronger return response to spending from high-FICO-score, high-liquidity, and loyal customers. The transmission speed of disaggregated sales information is slower than that of the earnings information, and small firms or firms far from their end customers exhibit a more delayed price response. Finally, the return implications of adjusted customer spending extend to firms along the production chain.
论文原文：Sumit Agarwal, Wenlan Qian, Xin Zou (2021) Disaggregated Sales and Stock Returns. Management Science 67(11):7167-7183.
28、 “严峻的商业逆风和未知的经济水域”：在收益电话会议中使用委婉用语
"Stiff Business Headwinds and Uncharted Economic Waters": The Use of Euphemisms in Earnings Conference Calls
本文研究委婉用语是否会混淆财报电话会议的内容并导致投资者反应不足。我认为，管理者使用委婉用语可以减轻坏消息的影响并延迟市场对不利信息的反应。使用公司委婉用语词典，我发现管理者使用它们——而不是分析师——与立即和未来的异常回报都呈负相关，并且它们的频率缓和了市场对坏消息的负面反应。最后，在繁忙的收益公布日期，当投资者注意力分散时，股票反应不足更为明显。
This paper studies whether euphemisms obfuscate the content of earnings conference calls and cause investors to underreact. I argue that managers' use of euphemisms can alleviate the impact of bad news and delay the market reaction to adverse information. Using a dictionary of corporate euphemisms, I find that their use by managers-but not by analysts-is negatively associated with both immediate and future abnormal returns, and their frequency moderates the negative market reaction to bad earnings news. Finally, stock underreaction is more pronounced on busy earnings announcement dates, when investor attention is distracted.
论文原文：Kate Suslava (2021) “Stiff Business Headwinds and Uncharted Economic Waters”: The Use of Euphemisms in Earnings Conference Calls. Management Science 67(11):7184-7213.
29、财务报告和创业融资：来自股权众筹的证据
Financial Reporting and Entrepreneurial Finance: Evidence from Equity Crowdfunding
我通过检查财务报表披露是否会增加通过股权众筹筹集的资金来研究会计和财务报告在创业融资中的作用。平均而言，我发现财务报告和筹集的资本之间存在正相关，这表明会计减少了与潜在投资者的信息不对称。此外，财务报告在股权众筹中的重要性在横截面中可预测地变化。具体而言，当公司的历史运营时间较长、宏观经济不确定性较高的时期以及有详细的股东协议补充时，财务报告与筹集的资金增加有关。最后，使用中介分析，我发现有证据表明财务报告通过增加筹集资金的可能性与更好的事后绩效间接相关。这些结果提供了对财务报告在创业融资中的作用的洞察，并为关于股权众筹市场监管和披露的持续辩论提供了信息。
I study the role of accounting and financial reporting in entrepreneurial finance by examining whether financial statement disclosure increases capital raised through equity crowdfunding. On average, I find a positive association between financial reporting and capital raised, suggesting that accounting reduces information asymmetry with potential investors. Additionally, the importance of financial reporting in equity crowdfunding varies predictably in the cross-section. Specifically, financial reporting is associated with greater capital raised when the firm has longer historical operations, during periods of higher macroeconomic uncertainty, and when complemented by detailed shareholder agreements. Finally, using a mediation analysis, I find evidence that financial reporting is indirectly associated with better ex post performance by increasing the likelihood of raising capital. These results provide insight into the role of financial reporting in entrepreneurial finance and inform the ongoing debate over regulation and disclosure in the equity crowdfunding market.
论文原文：John Donovan (2021) Financial Reporting and Entrepreneurial Finance: Evidence from Equity Crowdfunding. Management Science 67(11):7214-7237.
30、政策不确定性与创新：来自中国首次公开募股干预的证据
Policy Uncertainty and Innovation: Evidence from Initial Public Offering Interventions in China
公开股权是风险资本的重要来源，尤其是在中国。中国政府偶尔会暂停 IPO，使已获准进行 IPO 的公司面临不确定的上市延迟。上市的临时禁令增加了受影响公司进入公开市场的不确定性。我们表明，暂停导致的延迟会在延迟期间和上市后的几年内减少企业的创新活动。对有形投资的负面影响和对杠杆的正面影响是暂时的，这与上市后解决停牌期间的财务限制是一致的。我们的结果表明，可预测的、运作良好的 IPO 市场对于公司价值创造很重要。他们证明企业创新是累积性的，并且受到政策不确定性的负面影响。
Public equity is an important source of risk capital, especially in China. The Chinese government has occasionally suspended IPOs, exposing firms already approved to IPO to indeterminate listing delays. The temporary bar on going public increases uncertainty about access to public markets for affected firms. We show that suspension-induced delay reduces corporate innovation activity both during the delay and for years after listing. Negative effects on tangible investment and positive effects on leverage are temporary, consistent with financial constraints during the suspensions being resolved after listing. Our results suggest that predictable, well-functioning IPO markets are important for firm value creation. They demonstrate that corporate innovation is cumulative and is negatively affected by policy uncertainty.
论文原文：Lin William Cong, Sabrina T. Howell (2021) Policy Uncertainty and Innovation: Evidence from Initial Public Offering Interventions in China. Management Science 67(11):7238-7261.
31、国际市场中的全球股票相关性
Global Equity Correlation in International Markets
我们提供的经验证据表明，全球股票相关性的创新是国际市场上可行的定价因素。我们开发了一个程式化的模型来论证为什么这是一个合理的候选因素，并提出了一种简单的测量方法。我们发现我们的因子具有稳健的负风险价格，并显着改善了各种资产类别的联合横截面拟合，包括全球股票、商品、主权债券、外汇汇率和期权。在探索我们的因子在外汇市场上的定价能力时，我们还通过作为综合风险工具的全球股票相关性来阐明国际股票和货币市场之间的联系。
We present empirical evidence that the innovation in global equity correlation is a viable pricing factor in international markets. We develop a stylized model to motivate why this is a reasonable candidate factor and propose a simple way to measure it. We find that our factor has a robust negative price of risk and significantly improves the joint cross-sectional fits across various asset classes, including global equities, commodities, sovereign bonds, foreign exchange rates, and options. In exploring the pricing ability of our factor on the FX market, we also shed light on the link between international equity and currency markets through global equity correlations as an instrument for aggregate risks.
论文原文：Joon Woo Bae, Redouane Elkamhi (2021) Global Equity Correlation in International Markets. Management Science 67(11):7262-7289.
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