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域外动态||美国反垄断研究所要求反垄断局重新考虑对标准必要专利所做的撤销决定

域外动态||美国反垄断研究所要求反垄断局重新考虑对标准必要专利所做的撤销决定 武大知识产权与竞争法
2019-03-29
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AAI Asks Antitrust Division to Reconsider Its Reversal 

on Standard-Essential Patents


美国反垄断研究所要求反垄断局重新

考虑对标准必要专利所做的撤销决定


In a letter to Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) asked the Antitrust Division to reconsider its withdrawal from its 2013 Joint Policy Statement with the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) on Remedies for Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). The Policy Statement endorsed sensible limits on the International Trade Commission’s issuance of exclusion orders, which ban imports of products into the United States if the products infringe a U.S. patent. It cautioned against such orders when the alleged infringer’s products are compliant with industry standards and the patent holder has voluntarily committed to a standard-setting organization (SSO) to license the patent on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms.

美国反垄断研究所在给助理检察长马坎·德拉辛的一封信中要求反垄断局重新考虑退出2013年与专利商标局关于标准必要专利补救措施的联合政策声明。该政策声明通过了对国际贸易委员会发布排除令的合理限制,该排除令禁止在某产品侵犯美国专利的情况下进口该产品。当涉嫌侵权人的产品符合行业标准并且专利持有人自愿向标准制定组织承诺将会遵循合理和非歧视性条款许可专利时,它告诫不要发布此类命令。

The AAI letter also objects to the Division’s heightened scrutiny of SSOs that clarify the meaning of RAND commitments in ways that supposedly favor product manufacturers but that are entirely consistent with patent law. It expresses alarm that the Division is now suggesting that such conduct might result in a Division investigation or enforcement action when the Division previously encouraged SSOs to clarify their patent policies and procedures to mitigate the risks of “patent holdup” and disputes over licensing terms.

美国反垄断研究所在这封信中也反对反垄断局对标准制定组织的严格审查,这些标准制定组织以可能有利于产品制造商但完全符合专利法的方式解释了合理和非歧视承诺的含义。令美国反垄断研究所感到震惊的是,反垄断局认为当其先前鼓励的标准制定组织厘清了专利政策和程序并减少“专利劫持”风险和许可条款争议时,此类行为可能会导致反垄断局的调查或执法行为。

“Patent holdup” is a serious anticompetitive problem that can harm consumers and innovation.  Once patented technology is incorporated into a standard during the standard-setting process, it can become prohibitively difficult for the industry to switch to a different technology (or to an altogether different standard). As the 2013 Joint Policy Statement explained, the resulting lock-in can confer market power on the owner of the patented technology.  And patent holdup occurs when the owner exploits this power by “asserting the patent to exclude a competitor from a market or obtain a higher price for its use than would have been possible before the standard was set, when alternative technologies could have been chosen.”

“专利劫持”是一个严重的反竞争问题,其会损害消费者利益和创新。在标准制定过程中一旦将专利技术纳入标准,行业可能难以转向不同的技术(或完全不同的标准)。正如2013年联合政策声明所解释的那样,由此产生的锁定可以赋予专利技术所有者市场力量。当所有者利用这一力量“声称当专利将竞争对手排除在市场之外或获得比标准制定或替代技术被选定之前更高的使用价格时”,专利劫持就会发生。

Patent holdup is a particular problem in information technology industries when manufacturers are locked into a standard and an exclusion order or injunction is based on a patent or patents that cover only a minor component of a complex multicomponent product, like a smartphone. In those circumstances patent holdup gives extraordinary leverage to a single patent holder to tax (and misappropriate) investments in innovation made by manufacturers or other patent holders.

专利劫持是信息技术行业的一个特殊问题。制造商被锁定在一个标准中,而排除令或强制令只是基于一项或多项专利,并且这些专利只涵盖复杂组合产品(如智能手机)中的一小部分。在这种情况下,专利劫持为单个专利持有人提供了非凡的杠杆作用,其可以对制造商或其他专利持有人的创新进行税收(和盗用)投资。

The letter criticizes the Division’s unilateral about-face on the competitive problem of patent holdup through a series of speeches given by the Assistant Attorney General that treat patent holdup as a positive feature of the patent system. It calls for the Division to hold a public roundtable, workshop, or hearings with the FTC and a cross section of legal and economic academics, affected stakeholders, and former agency officials to address whether developments in economic theory, empirical studies, or other factors warrant a change in policy.

该信批评了反垄断局通过助理检察长发表的一系列讲话对专利持有的竞争问题的单方面态度,即将专利劫持视为专利制度的一个积极特征。美国反垄断研究所要求反垄断局与美国联邦贸易委员会、法律学者、经济学者、受影响的利益相关者以及前机构官员一同举行公开的圆桌会议、研讨会或听证会,讨论经济理论、实证研究或其他因素的发展是否需要改变政策。

The letter makes the following additional points:

The Division’s new policy minimizing the risk and harm of patent holdup is inconsistent with the policies of both the Obama and Bush administrations, and it breaks with years of study by the Bush administration that culminated in a joint report by the Division and FTC issued in 2007.

The Division’s new policy is inconsistent with the position of the current FTC.

The Division’s new policy is inconsistent with patent law, which generally bars injunctions for infringement of RAND-encumbered patents.

The Division’s new policy is not justified by the risk of patent “holdout,” whereby manufacturers decline to take a license or pay too little for a license. Patent law already takes this risk into account by permitting injunctions when a putative licensee refuses to engage in good-faith negotiations. Moreover, manufacturers have other incentives to negotiate a license.

A “free market” bargain with respect to a patent license is not a bargain made under the shadow of an injunction, as the Division now suggests, but rather is one that approximates the hypothetical bargain that would have occurred before the patent holder’s technology was incorporated into a standard.

Heightened scrutiny of SSO patent policies is not warranted when the policies are consistent with prevailing patent law.

SSO clarification of RAND terms is generally procompetitive, particularly when changes apply prospectively and are designed to promote the widespread adoption of standards.

Due process is an important bulwark against anticompetitive conduct by SSOs, but the most important consideration is whether decisionmakers make an informed decision that reflects the best interests of the SSO as a whole in the widespread adoption of its standards.

信中提出了以下补充要点:

该部门的新政策最大限度地降低了专利劫持的风险和危害,这与奥巴马政府和布什政府的政策都不一致,而且与布什政府多年的研究有关。这最终使得反垄断局和联邦贸易委员会于2007年发布联合报告。

该部门的新政策与当前美国联邦贸易委员会的立场不一致。

该部门的新政策与专利法不一致,后者通常发布禁止侵犯合理和非歧视性担保专利的禁令。

该部门的新政策是没有理由的。因为存在“反向专利劫持”的风险,即制造商拒绝领取许可证或为许可证支付少量费用。专利法已经考虑到了这一风险,当假定的被许可人拒绝进行善意谈判时,专利法已经通过允许禁令将这种风险考虑在内。此外,制造商还有其他动力来协商许可证。

与专利许可有关的“自由市场”交易并不是像该部门目前认为的那样是在强制令的阴影下进行的交易,而是近似于专利持有人的技术被纳入一项标准之前就会发生的假设的交易。

当政策符合现行专利法时,没有理由加强对标准制定组织专利政策的审查。

标准制定组织对合理和非歧视术语的解释通常是具有说服力的,特别是当变化前瞻性地适用时。该解释目的是促进广泛采用标准。

正当程序是制止标准制定组织的反竞争行为的重要堡垒。但是,最重要的考虑因素是决策者是否做出明智的决策,以反映了标准制定组织作为一个整体的最大利益。

来源:https://www.antitrustinstitute.org


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