大数跨境

域外动态||小心反垄断机构不公平地使用行为洞察力因素(谷歌和欧盟委员会的故事)

域外动态||小心反垄断机构不公平地使用行为洞察力因素(谷歌和欧盟委员会的故事) 武大知识产权与竞争法
2019-05-17
4


点击上方蓝字关注我!



Beware the Unfair Use of Behavioral Insights by Antitrust Agencies (A Story of Google and The European Commission)

小心反垄断机构不公平地使用行为洞察力因素(谷歌和欧盟委员会的故事)


Let’s play a game: I pretend to write the script of a movie, and you tell me which movie that could be. OK, here we go:

让我们玩一场游戏:我假装写一部电影的剧本,你告诉我电影是什么。好的,我们开始吧:

1. The Setup

In platform markets, one side (generally, advertisers) is paying while the other may not pay with the thing we call… money. This is not true for all platforms, users pay for Netflix, and Airbnb, and Uber, and Amazon; but this is true for numerous of them, including Google, and Facebook, and Instagram.

As such, when the owner of a platform is said to abuse its dominance on the side where users are paying, antitrust authorities have a hard time showing consumer harm on the other side. For that reason (I guess), the European Commission barely mentions any harm in the press releases of its three Google decisions.

No worries, antitrust authorities have found a way out by arguing that a reduction in choices – due to the elimination of one company on the paying side – necessarily hurts the consumer. In Google Shopping, the EC held that the company “denied European consumers a genuine choice of services and the full benefits of innovation.” In Google Android, it was essentially found that the company had deprived choices to the consumer by denying “rivals the chance to innovate.” And finally, in Google AdSense, Margrethe Vestager held that “the most important thing is to enable user choice,” adding that “the ability to choose also makes you feel that you’re in control.” OK, feelings are important, but… should the EC make sure that users feel good? Maybe it’s part of the consumer welfare, I don’t know, this is not the point anyway.

 

1.设置

在平台市场中,一方(通常是广告商)付费,而另一方可能不会支付我们称之为钱的东西。并不是所有的平台都是这样,用户会向Netflix、Airbnb、Uber和Amazon支付费用;但大多数平台都是如此,例如Google、Facebook和Instagram。

因此,当一个平台的所有者在用户付费的一方滥用其支配地位时,反垄断当局很难在另一方显示对消费者的损害。出于这个原因(据我猜测),欧盟委员会在对谷歌作出三项决定的新闻稿中几乎没有提到任何损害。

不用担心,反垄断当局已经找到了一条出路,其认定由于一家付费公司被淘汰而减少用户选择必然会伤害消费者。在谷歌购物中,欧盟委员会认为,该公司“剥夺了欧洲消费者对服务的实际选择和来源于创新的全部利益。”在谷歌安卓系统中,人们发现该公司剥夺了消费者的选择,因为它剥夺了“竞争对手创新的机会”。最后,在谷歌广告中,玛格莉特·维斯塔格认为“最重要的事情是让用户选择”,并补充说“能够选择也会让你觉得一切在自己的掌控之中。”好吧,感觉很重要,但是电子商务应该确保用户感觉良好吗?也许这是消费者福利的一部分。我不知道,反正这不是重点。

2. The disruptive factor

In the Google Shopping decision, the European Commission has made clear that behavioral economics has a role to play in competition law (I challenged this idea along with some Nobel laureates over here). There’s even one section named “7.2.3.1. Analysis of user behaviour“. In Google Android and Google Adsense, the Commission… wait, we don’t know yet because we are still waiting for the decisions to be published (but, once again, this is not the point).

I will not discuss today why I think that using behavioral insights in antitrust ruling is tricky business, but I will make the case that if they are to be used, it should be done fairly (it’s all about fairness, remember). In other words, either antitrust authorities do not use behavioral insights and rely on the (unbounded) rationality of consumers, or if they use them, they must then study both sides of the coin, not just the side that shows a number (a fine).


2.破坏因素

在谷歌购物决策中,欧盟委员会明确表示,行为经济学在竞争法中发挥重要作用(我对这一想法与一些诺贝尔奖获得者在这里提出了挑战)。甚至有一个叫做“7.2.3.1.用户行为分析”的部分。在谷歌安卓和谷歌广告中,委员会……等等,我们还不知道,因为我们还在等待要公布的决定(但是,再次申明,这不是重点)。

我将不会讨论为什么我认为在反垄断裁决中使用行为洞察力是一件棘手的事情,但我会说明如果要使用它们,就应该公平地进行(记住,这都是关于公平的)。换句话说,要么反垄断当局不使用行为洞察力,只依赖消费者的(无限)理性,要么如果他们使用行为洞察力,他们就必须研究硬币的两面,而不仅仅是显示数字的一面(罚款)。

3. The point of no return

A multitude of behavioral studies tends to indicate that the more choice is given to consumers, to more they actually go for the first or the default option. This is called the “Choice Overload,” or, the “Paradox of Choice.” The authors of the Behavioral Economics Guide 2018 discuss a great deal about it, and so does the American psychologist Barry Schwartz, see his book on the subject, or his TED talk. Actually, a study published in the Journal of Consumer Psychology recently has shown that the more choice is given to consumers, the fewer consumers would buy (or click on) anything.

Put differently, behavioral insights indicate that more choice is not always pro-consumers, as it may confuse us them. Let’s make the test ourselves. Let’s imagine that you are looking for a video-editing app. Here are two results on your search app:

Now, let me guess. On the left screen, you probably had a look at the three alternatives and realized that the 3rd option was interesting (I just know it), while on the right screen, you did not really have a look at all alternatives and just wanted to take the first one. Why is that? Well, your behavior is actually described by Bob Aumann’s (2005 Nobel laureates in Economics) concept of rule-rationality “according to which people do not maximize utility in each of their acts, but rather follow rules or modes of behavior that usually–but not always–maximize utility” (I also discussed that with him over here).

In short, it is rational for users not to spend one hour studying all alternatives if, in general, the first options are as good as the last ones (and sensibly of the same quality). On the contrary, if only three options are made available, it may be worth actually spending three minutes examining them all since it’s possible to cover all the offers and see by ourselves. For that reason, again, antitrust authorities can’t simply assume that a reduction in choice necessarily hurt consumers. They have to prove it.


3.无路可退

大量的行为研究表明,消费者的选择越多,他们实际上就会选择第一种或默认的选择。这被称为“选择过载”,或者“选择的悖论”。《2018年行为经济学指南》的作者们对此进行了大量讨论,美国心理学家巴里·施瓦茨也对此进行了大量的研究。事实上,最近发表在《消费者心理学》杂志上的一项研究表明,给消费者的选择越多,消费者购买(或点击)商品的次数就越少。

换句话说,行为洞察力表明,更多的选择并不总是有利于消费者,因为它可能会使他们感到困惑。让我们来做一个测试吧。假设您正在寻找一个视频编辑应用程序。以下是您搜索应用程序的两个结果:

现在让我猜猜。在左边的屏幕上,你可能看了三种选择,并意识到第三种选择很有趣(我就知道是这样)。而在右边的屏幕上,你并没有真正地看过所有的选择,只想选择第一种。那是为什么?你的行为实际上正如2005年诺贝尔经济学奖得主鲍勃·奥曼的“规则理性”概念所描述那样,“根据这一概念,人们在他们的每一次行为中都不会最大化效用,而是遵循通常(但并不总是)最大化效用的规则或行为模式”(针对这一点,我也和他讨论过)。

简而言之,用户不花一个小时研究所有的替代方案是合理的。一般来说,第一个选项和最后一个选项是一样好的(并且具有相同的品质)。相反,如果只有三个选项,它们可能值得花三分钟进行审查,因为它们三个是我们可以看到的全部选项。因此,反垄断当局不能简单地假设减少用户选择必然会伤害消费者。他们必须证明这一点。

4. The Final Push

Did the European Commission prove that a reduction in choice was hurting the consumer in the Google cases? Well… not at all.

In fact, the European Commission only presumed it and, by doing so, has contradicted itself. In its Google Android press release, the EC “has concluded that Google has engaged in two instances of illegal tying,” the first being “the tying of the Google Search app.” The harm? By pre-installing its search app, Google made sure that other search app wouldn’t be able to thrive (same logic as the one in the now oooooold Microsoft case). OK.

At the same time, and it’s where it gets crispy, Google was also sanctioned for the “tying of the Google Chrome browser.” Hm… so, if I get it right, it means that most consumers are too lazy to install another browser to try if they like it better, or, at least, that they don’t care enough to do so. As such, tying the browser ensured Google that users would actually use it. Well, OK, but if that is true, it also means that users do not use Google search app in order to look for alternatives, even for the app they use the most (granted, some of them probably use Snapchat a little bit more). In other words, it leads to the conclusion that imposing Google search app did not cause any harm because people don’t use it anyway, and/or wouldn’t use another search app. The snake is biting its own tail.


4.最后一博

欧盟委员会是否证明在谷歌案中减少选择会损害消费者的利益?没有证明。

事实上,欧洲委员会只是进行假设,并通过这一假设作出决定。这是自相矛盾的。在欧盟委员会发布的关于谷歌安卓的决定的新闻稿中,欧盟委员会“已经得出结论,即谷歌参与了两起非法捆绑事件,”首先是“谷歌搜索应用的捆绑”。危害?通过预先安装其搜索应用程序,谷歌确保了用户不会使用其他搜索应用(与现在过时的微软案例具有相同的逻辑)。好的。

与此同时,谷歌也因“捆绑谷歌Chrome浏览器”而受到制裁。所以,如果我猜测正确的话,这意味着如果消费者更喜欢Chrome浏览器,那么他们都懒得安装另一个浏览器,或者是他们不太在意其他浏览器。因此,捆绑浏览器确保了谷歌用户将实际使用该浏览器。好吧,但如果是这样的话,这也意味着用户不会为了寻找替代品而使用谷歌搜索应用,即使是他们使用最多的应用程序(当然,他们中的一些人可能更多地使用Snapchat)。换句话说,欧盟委员会得出的结论是,强制使用谷歌搜索应用并不会造成任何损害,因为人们无论如何都不会使用它,而且/或不会使用其他搜索应用程序。这是一个循环往复的无解过程。

5. The Aftermath

In short, if antitrust authorities (starting with the European Commission) wish to use behavioral insights, let us hope that they will do so more fairly in the future. This is, generally speaking, the problem with the use of such insights: they kill legal certainty because they depend too much on the specifics. They are also very often goal-oriented (here, sanctioning a company) and applied in a partisan way. Failing to be fair with behavioral insights and studying the two sides of the coin, antitrust authorities will transform the film I’m describing into European Psycho (a remake of American Psycho).


5.后果

简而言之,如果反垄断当局们(包括欧盟委员会)将运用行为洞察力,我们希望他们在未来能够更公平地运用。一般来说,这就是使用洞察力的问题所在:它们扼杀了法律的确定性,因为它们过于依赖细节。它们也常常是以目标为导向的(在这里,是对一家公司的制裁),并以一种偏袒性的方式加以应用。未能公平地运用行为洞察力和研究硬币的两面,反垄断当局将把我描述的电影拍成《欧洲心理医生》(《美国心理医生》的翻版)。

来源:https://leconcurrentialiste.com

涉及文章内容转载等事宜请联系

微信公众号后台编辑:刘梦佳

审核人:钟思颖、赵丰

邮箱:cptlaw@163.com

手机:15357562155 18817837465


【声明】内容源于网络
0
0
武大知识产权与竞争法
1234
内容 1795
粉丝 0
武大知识产权与竞争法 1234
总阅读711
粉丝0
内容1.8k