— When Critical Resources Become “Manageable Variables” Between U.S.-China Competition and Cooperation
From September 23 to 25, 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to the United States. During the visit, the two heads of state held in-depth discussions on building a constructive China-U.S. strategic stability relationship and major international and regional issues, reaching an eight-point consensus.
The fifth point of the consensus explicitly recognized the positive role of the China-U.S. economic and trade consultation mechanism, including the establishment and advancement of mechanisms such as a Trade Council, the implementation of a “US$30 billion” reciprocal tariff reduction arrangement, and the extension of outcomes from the Kuala Lumpur economic and trade consultations. Meanwhile, during the eighth round of China-U.S. economic and trade consultations held in New York, the two sides reached multiple understandings on implementing existing trade consultation outcomes, reciprocal tariff arrangements, and establishing Trade and Investment Councils.
However, rare earths were not mentioned in the eight-point consensus.
This raises a question:
Why did an issue that affects global industrial chains and involves critical mineral security not appear in the public document?
It is important to clarify at the outset: the absence of rare earths from the public document does not prove that the two sides discussed a specific arrangement, nor does it prove the existence of any undisclosed agreement.
A more cautious interpretation is that rare earths have become an important strategic variable in China-U.S. relations, while both sides may seek to keep the issue within a manageable range rather than allow it to become the defining symbol of bilateral relations.
The term “manageable variable” means that both sides recognize its importance and are aware of its potential spillover risks, but prefer to use rules and mechanisms to define the boundaries of competition rather than allow the issue to escalate into comprehensive confrontation.
Whether this concept accurately describes the situation, however, can only be tested through subsequent observable developments.
I. Public Outcomes and Deeper Negotiations: Two Levels of China-U.S. Relations
According to publicly available information, the eight-point consensus covers:
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building a constructive China-U.S. strategic stability relationship based on respect, fairness, and reciprocity; -
mutual support for hosting APEC and G20 leaders’ meetings; -
issues related to Iran’s nuclear program and international waterways; -
World War II historical narratives; -
economic and trade consultation mechanisms and tariff arrangements; -
counternarcotics cooperation; -
artificial intelligence dialogue mechanisms; -
giant panda cooperation.
In addition, the Chinese and U.S. militaries agreed to accelerate the signing of a memorandum of understanding on strengthening crisis communication and prevention.
These issues share a common characteristic:
They are suitable for inclusion in a leaders-level statement.
Such statements primarily serve to:
-
stabilize strategic expectations; -
manage relationship risks; -
signal willingness for cooperation.
However, some of the most complex issues in China-U.S. relations—including rare earths and critical minerals, semiconductor equipment, advanced technology export controls, dual-use technologies, and supply chain security—usually require handling through:
-
economic and trade mechanisms; -
working groups; -
export licensing systems; -
corporate compliance procedures.
Therefore, major-power relations often operate on two levels:
Public documents determine the political atmosphere; implementation mechanisms determine the boundaries of interests.
Rare earths belong more to the latter category.
II. The Absence of Rare Earths Has Multiple Possible Explanations
There are at least four possible explanations for why rare earths did not appear in the public consensus.
First, the two sides may not have treated rare earths as part of the publicly announced outcomes.
The agenda of a leaders-level document is shaped by many factors, and rare earths may simply not have been selected as a topic for public presentation.
Second, the issue may have been discussed but considered unsuitable for inclusion in a general statement.
Rare earths involve highly technical issues such as export licensing, end-use verification, and military-civilian application distinctions, which are difficult to summarize in one or two sentences in a leaders’ declaration.
Third, the issue may already have been incorporated into existing economic and trade mechanisms.
It is worth noting that rare earth export control measures were previously brought into the China-U.S. economic and trade consultation framework. China’s export control measures announced on October 9, 2025, including those related to rare earths, were suspended until November 10, 2026, according to the Kuala Lumpur consensus.
This suggests that rare earth export controls had already entered the track of China-U.S. trade negotiations.
Fourth, both sides may seek to reduce the political visibility of the rare earth issue.
This could prevent it from becoming a symbolic source of confrontation in bilateral relations.
Therefore, it would be inaccurate to conclude:
“Rare earths were not mentioned because they are too important.”
It would also be inaccurate to conclude:
“Rare earths were not mentioned because they are unimportant.”
A more reasonable interpretation is:
Rare earths are an issue that requires continuous management rather than simple political statements.
However, all four explanations remain hypotheses. Their validity depends on observable developments in future mechanisms and implementation.
III. Why Rare Earths Are Sensitive: Beyond an Ordinary Trade Issue
The importance of rare earths does not lie merely in their status as mineral resources.
They are connected to an entire industrial chain:
-
resource supply; -
separation and refining; -
permanent magnets; -
electric vehicles; -
robotics; -
aerospace; -
defense industries.
The scale of this industrial advantage is reflected in available data.
In 2025, global rare earth mine production was approximately 390,000 tonnes, with China accounting for about 69.2% (270,000 tonnes). More importantly, China dominates the midstream sector: it accounts for roughly 90% of global rare earth separation and refining capacity. In heavy rare earths, China’s share exceeds 90%. China also produces approximately 90% of the world’s rare earth permanent magnets.
This means that much of the rare earth concentrate mined outside China still relies on Chinese facilities for separation and processing.
However, China does not have no weaknesses.
High-end equipment manufacturing, certain core patents, recycling systems, and raw material security still require further improvement. Whether resource advantages can be transformed into sustainable industrial and rule-setting advantages depends on continued technological innovation and ecosystem development.
If rare earths were directly included in a leaders-level outcome document, it could generate additional political effects:
On one hand, it could intensify perceptions of strategic competition over resources;
On the other hand, it could further accelerate the securitization and politicization of rare earth issues.
For both sides, this may not be the most advantageous approach.
IV. Another Meaning of Rare Earth Silence: Avoiding a New Symbol of Strategic Rivalry
Another possible interpretation is that the lack of emphasis on rare earths reflects recognition that excessive politicization of critical resources could increase adjustment costs across global supply chains.
If rare earths became a defining symbol of China-U.S. rivalry:
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the United States could further accelerate supply chain diversification; -
other countries could expand alternative supply arrangements; -
companies could increase inventory and relocation costs.
At the same time, China must also consider how to maintain supply chain attractiveness while safeguarding resource security.
Therefore, rare earth governance involves a balance:
Maintaining security while avoiding damage to the advantages of an open industrial system.
However, this interpretation requires conditions for verification.
Only if subsequent developments show institutionalized arrangements—such as critical mineral working groups under the Trade Council, stable export licensing procedures, or operational agreements on end-use verification—can the “silence as management signal” interpretation be supported.
Otherwise, silence could simply reflect unresolved differences or agenda allocation.
V. Rare Earth Competition Is Shifting from Resource Control to Rule-Making
The simplest way to frame the rare earth issue is:
“Will China supply or not?”
But the real questions are much more complex:
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What products can be exported? -
Which companies qualify for licenses? -
How is end use verified? -
How are military and civilian applications distinguished? -
How can sensitive technologies be prevented from diversion?
The future competition is not only about ownership of resources.
It is increasingly about:
who defines the rules governing resource flows.
In February 2026, China’s Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs issued six export control announcements covering strategic items including lithium batteries, synthetic graphite anode materials, rare earth equipment and raw materials, heavy rare earths, and superhard materials. These measures also included controls on key technologies within the rare earth sector and applied regulatory approaches involving extraterritorial reach, minimum content thresholds, and direct-product rules.
This indicates that rare earth competition is moving from resource competition toward competition over industrial organization capacity and rule-making capability.
In the past:
Who controlled the mines determined competitive advantage.
Today:
Who controls technology, standards, certification, and supply chain nodes determines long-term advantage.
VI. China and the United States Have Different Security Priorities
Both China and the United States discuss security, but their emphasis differs.
U.S. discourse focuses more on:
supply chain resilience
—whether critical industries are vulnerable to dependence on a single source.
Chinese discourse emphasizes:
security and controllability
—whether critical resources and related technologies could flow into sensitive areas.
However, the two approaches are not entirely contradictory.
More accurately:
Both sides pursue supply security and controllability simultaneously, but differ in priorities and definitions of risk.
Supply security requires rules.
Security and controllability also require openness.
The fundamental question is:
How do the two sides define risks, and who participates in shaping the management rules?
VII. Why Can AI Enter the Consensus While Rare Earths Remain in Mechanisms?
Artificial intelligence was included as a public issue in the eight-point consensus.
The seventh point specifically states that China and the United States agreed to establish an AI dialogue mechanism, exchange views on related risks and benefits, and establish communication channels for AI-related incidents.
This does not mean AI is more important than rare earths.
The two issues are simply at different stages.
AI currently focuses more on:
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communication mechanisms; -
risk management; -
international rule exploration.
Therefore, it is suitable for principle-level discussion.
Rare earths, however, already involve:
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product classification; -
corporate licensing; -
customs enforcement; -
supply chain adjustments.
They require concrete rules rather than general statements.
A more accurate comparison is:
AI is currently suited to risk communication and principles; rare earths have already entered the stage of licensing, customs, compliance, and industrial rules.
VIII. The Real Strategic Value of Rare Earths Is Industrial Capability, Not Restriction Capability
The strategic value of rare earths does not simply lie in:
“whether supply can be restricted.”
The more important question is whether they can generate durable, irreplaceable industrial advantages.
Such advantages include:
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technological capability; -
manufacturing capacity; -
accumulated process expertise; -
standard-setting influence; -
industrial ecosystems.
The United States and its allies are accelerating efforts to build alternative rare earth supply chains. MP Materials, for example, reported significant growth in neodymium-praseodymium oxide production in 2025 and began producing initial neodymium iron boron magnets at its Texas facility, supported by government incentives.
These developments show that alternative supply chains are emerging, although they still face a significant gap compared with China’s existing integrated industrial system.
Resource advantages are only the starting point.
Industrial advantages determine sustainability.
Rule-setting advantages determine long-term influence.
IX. What Does the Rare Earth Silence in the Eight-Point Consensus Mean?
The absence of rare earths from the consensus does not mean the issue has disappeared.
A more likely interpretation is:
Rare earths have entered a complex management phase within China-U.S. economic relations.
Whether rare earths truly function as a “manageable variable” requires observation of several indicators:
First, whether the Trade Council establishes mechanisms related to critical minerals or supply chains.
If critical minerals become part of institutionalized dialogue, it would represent an important signal.
Second, how export licensing is implemented.
The key issue is not policy statements, but the stability, transparency, and efficiency of actual approvals.
Third, how global rare earth supply chains evolve.
This includes alternative production capacity, recycling systems, and potential enforcement regarding third-country transfers.
Fourth, whether future documents adopt new terminology.
Terms such as “critical minerals,” “supply chain resilience,” and “export controls” may provide signals about policy direction.
Fifth, what happens after the Kuala Lumpur consultation outcomes expire.
The November 10, 2026 deadline for the suspension of rare earth-related export control measures will be an important point for assessing future developments.
Conclusion: Silence Is Also a Signal—But It Requires Evidence
Rare earths were not mentioned in the eight-point consensus, but they have not disappeared from the core issues shaping China-U.S. relations.
In major-power relations, public documents send signals, and silence can also send signals.
The silence surrounding rare earths may contain two meanings:
On one hand, it reflects that rare earths have become an important variable affecting industrial chain security.
On the other hand, it may indicate that both sides seek to avoid making rare earths the sole narrative defining China-U.S. relations.
Of course, silence may also simply reflect unresolved differences or agenda choices.
The future of rare earths will not be determined by a single negotiation or by whether the word “rare earth” appears in a particular statement.
It will depend on who can transform resource advantages into:
technological advantages,
industrial advantages,
and rule-setting advantages.
The future competition is not only about controlling resources.
More importantly, it is about:
defining how resources flow.
(The description of the eight-point consensus is based on publicly released official texts. Rare earth industry data are drawn from the U.S. Geological Survey and industry research sources. Export control policy descriptions are based on publicly available information from China’s Ministry of Commerce.)