作者：金杜律师事务所 King & Wood Mallesons
合资企业股东同意“任何一方可以将争议提交至具有约束力的仲裁”。随后股东起争执，最终对簿公堂并就中止程序展开争论。
Shareholders to JV agree that “any party may submit the dispute to binding arbitration”. Shareholders then get into a dispute, end up in Court and argue about stay.
当事人是一家英属维尔京群岛合资企业的股东。股东协议受英国法律管辖。因Anzen被指控在管理合资企业时的不公平损害行为而产生争议。Hermes在英属维尔京群岛法院提起诉讼。Anzen试图依《英属维尔京群岛仲裁条例》第6（2）条中止该等程序，请求法院在确信存在有效的与其审理之事项有关的仲裁协议的情况下中止程序。
The parties were shareholders in a BVI joint venture. The shareholders agreement was governed by English law. A dispute arose regarding Anzen’s allegedly unfairly prejudicial conduct in the management of the JV. Hermes commenced proceedings in the BVI courts. Anzen sought a stay of those proceedings pursuant to Section 6(2) of the BVI’s Arbitration Ordinance, which required the court to stay proceedings if it was satisfied that there was a valid arbitration agreement in respect of the matter in front of it.
Anzen依赖股东协议第19.5条的争议解决规定：如出现争议，“任何一方可以将争议提交至具有约束力的仲裁”。
Anzen relied on the dispute resolution provision at clause 19.5 of the shareholders agreement: in the event of a dispute “any party may submit the dispute to binding arbitration”.
Hermes称，Anzen不可以依赖该等规定获得中止，除非其已就当前争议提起仲裁。一审和上诉法院均对此表示同意。对Anzen来说幸运的是，枢密院（“枢密院”）对此持不同看法。
Hermes said that Anzen could not rely on this provision to obtain a stay unless and until it had commenced an arbitration in respect of the dispute in hand. First instance and appellate courts agreed. Luckily for Anzen, the Privy Council (the “PC”) did not.
可以并不意味着应当 /May does not mean shall
不管第19.5条（其规定了适用规则（“ICC”）、仲裁地点、有关费用的立场等）的具体性质如何，枢密院认为“可以”可理解为“应当”的观点（及美国判例法）没有说服力：“剥夺当事人诉讼权的条款应该措辞清晰”。
Despite the detailed nature of clause 19.5 (which set out the applicable rules (“ICC”), the seat of arbitration, the position as to costs, etc.), the PC was unconvinced by arguments (and US case law) that “may” could be read as “shall”: “clauses depriving a party of the right to litigate should be expected to be clearly worded”.
该条款未要求所有争议应当提交仲裁，将法院的管辖权完全排除在外。它是一种允许，因为它授予任何一方选择将争议提交仲裁的权利。该等条款是可以强制执行的[1]。一旦行使了选择权，则双方有义务继续进行仲裁。
The clause did not require all disputes to be submitted to arbitration to the total exclusion of the court’s jurisdiction. It was permissive, in the sense that it gave either party the option to submit a dispute to arbitration. Such clauses are enforceable.[1] Once the option has been exercised, then both parties are obliged to proceed with arbitration.
为了有资格获得中止，必须行使选择权
To be entitled to a stay, the option must be exercised
枢密院很清楚，第6（2）条要求的不仅是未行使的允许的仲裁选择权。那么是否行使了选择权便能达成仲裁协议呢？
The PC was clear that Section 6(2) required more than an unexercised permissive option to arbitrate. Had then the option been exercised so as to give rise to an arbitration agreement?
Anzen无需提起ICC仲裁以行使选择权
Anzen did not need to commence an ICC arbitration to exercise the option
枢密院考虑了如下事实，即希望依赖其选择权的一方可能不希望为自己获得任何积极的救济，因此将被迫寻求获得不负有责任的声明。它必须遵循任何仲裁的先决条件（例如20天协商），并支付不可退款的ICC申请费。因此，枢密院认为，“将争议提交具有约束力的仲裁”这一商业上合理的概念解释[2]并不意味着该方必须提起仲裁。
The PC took into account the fact that the party wishing to rely on its option may not wish any positive relief for itself and so would be forced to seek a declaration of no liability. It would have to follow any pre-conditions to arbitration (for example 20 days of negotiation) and pay the non-refundable ICC filing fee. It held, therefore, that a commercially sensible interpretation[2] of the concept of “submitting a dispute to binding arbitration” did not mean that the party had to commence an arbitration.
对争议进行仲裁的明确要求和/或中止法院程序的申请是行使选择权的充分条件
An unequivocal request to arbitrate the dispute and/or an application for a stay of court proceedings was sufficient to exercise the option
枢密院称，一方必须在另一方承诺同意且不提起诉讼之前“坚持”仲裁，但是，一方可以通过明确要求或寻求中止以达到同样的目的。
The party must “insist” on arbitration before the other party’s promise to agree and not to litigate comes into being, but, said the PC, the party can do so by an unequivocal request, or by seeking a stay.
枢密院引用上议院在Bremer Vulkan 诉 South India Corp案[3]中的决定支持其观点，即仲裁协议的当事人“相互之间负有寻求仲裁的协助义务”。
The PC drew support for its view from the House of Lord’s decision in Bremer Vulkan v South India Corp[3] that parties to an arbitration agreement are under “mutual obligations to one another to cooperate in the pursuit of the arbitration”.
因此，Anzen有权获得其要求的中止。
Anzen was therefore entitled to the stay it sought.
评论 / Comment
枢密院的决定符合其一贯支持仲裁的裁决立场，且更多考虑了原来被告方的立场。该方不仅可能不希望为自己寻求积极的救济，它也可能完全不希望进行争议解决程序。当事人有意违背其意愿而被迫成为原告，这似乎不大可能。
The PC’s decision continues its line of pro-arbitration rulings, and takes much account of the position of the original defendant party. Not only may that party not wish any positive relief for itself, it may not wish for a contentious dispute resolution process at all. It seems unlikely that the parties intended that one should be forced to become the claimant protagonist against its wishes.
尽管如此，枢密院的决定基本上形成了先行者劣势的形势。原告方在一家具有司法管辖权的法院提起诉讼，因为它完全有权这样做。然后它必须等待并观察被告是否决定行使其仲裁的选择权。如果被告决定行使其仲裁选择权，则原告必须提起仲裁。这对每个人来说均耗费时间和金钱。
That said, the PC decision essentially creates a first mover disadvantage. The claimant party (C) commences proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction as it is perfectly entitled to do. It then must wait and see if the defendant (D) decides to exercise its option to arbitrate. If D does, C must then commence an arbitration. Everyone wastes time and cost.
被告不能要求原告支付原来程序的费用，因为原告在当时无义务不提起法院程序。被告不能要求原告承担其中止申请的费用，除非原告已不恰当地反对该申请。原告不能要求被告支付其法院程序费用，因为被告那时的行为是恰当的——当时仅行使了其选择权。原告不能要求被告支付其提起仲裁的重复费用（除非最终仲裁裁决其有权获得），因为被告要求原告重新开始是极其恰当的。
D cannot seek its costs of the original proceedings from C because there was at that time no obligation on C not to commence court proceedings. D cannot seek its costs of the stay application unless and until C improperly opposes the application. C cannot seek its wasted costs of its court proceedings because D was not acting improperly in only exercising its option at that point in time. C cannot seek its duplicative costs of commencing the arbitration (unless it is ultimately entitled to in the arbitration) because it is quite proper for D to require C to begin again.
为避免浪费金钱和时间，原告最好使被告提前作出选择，并要求被告确认是否将在原告提起诉讼之前选择仲裁。当然，如此一来，原告将承担被告在其他并非原告所选择的具有司法管辖权的法院提起诉讼的风险，在此情况下，原告只能选择（在该等法院可能不同意中止且原告不希望进行仲裁的情况下）依赖其仲裁选择权。
To avoid wasted costs and time, C would be well advised to put D to an early election, and seek a confirmation from D as to whether or not it will elect arbitration before C issues proceedings. C, of course, then runs the risk of D commencing proceedings in another competent court not of C’s choosing where C’s only option is rely on its arbitration option (in circumstances where that court may not agree a stay and C does not want to be in arbitration in any event).
很难找到任何绕开上述风险的办法。法院在NB Three Shipping Ltd 诉 Harebell Shipping Ltd案[4]（在单方面选择权的背景下）中指出：“如果所有人采取诉讼措施或在其他方面令承租人合理相信所有人不会行使中止选择权，则该选择权将不再可用”。尽管仲裁的选择权不是无限期的，但是，要求被告在其必须提出管辖权异议之前行使该等选择权是没有理由的。
It is hard to see any way round this risk. The Court noted in NB Three Shipping Ltd v Harebell Shipping Ltd,[4] in the context of a unilateral option: “It would cease to be available if Owners took a step in the action or they otherwise led Charterers to believe on reasonable grounds that the option to stay would not be exercised”. While an option to choose arbitration is not open-ended, however, there are no grounds to require a D to exercise it earlier than it must exercise any jurisdiction challenge.
尽管如此，枢密院认为一方可以通过寻求中止行使其选择权的观点似乎是循环论证：一方通过申请设立仲裁协议，而该协议则成为申请本身的依据。一个更有原则性的观点是，要求就被告的仲裁选择通知原告，这将成为寻求中止的依据。
That said, the PC view that a party could exercise its option by seeking a stay appears circular: the party creates the arbitration agreement that is the basis for its application by the application itself. A more principled view would be to require notice to be given to C of D’s election of arbitration, which is then the basis to seek the stay.
不可避免地，正如所有类似案件的文章得出的结论，对当事人最佳的解决方案是避免模棱两可的条款，并在最初起草协议时措辞准确。无论起草协议的初衷如何，裁决该事项的法院可能不会认同协议初衷。您可能希望（并认为您有权）维持法院程序，并对支持仲裁的决定感到失望。您可能相信您有权仲裁，但法院可能拒绝中止。
Inevitably, and as all articles about similar cases conclude, the best solution for parties is to avoid ambiguous clauses and draft for certainty in the first place. Regardless of what you intended by the drafting, the Court deciding the point may not agree. You may wish to maintain the court proceedings, and believe you are entitled to, and be disappointed by the pro-arbitration decision. You may believe you have a right to arbitrate, but the Court may decline a stay.
如果选择权对您来说非常重要，且您希望在特定争议出现之前，推迟争议解决方式的最终裁决，请考虑您是否可以单方面寻求这种选择权（但请注意世界各地针对单方面条款可执行性的规定）。如果仲裁是实际上选择的争议解决方式（如本股东协议可能就是这种意图），这种情况下，使用“应当”表达“必须”的意思。或者，如果法院是首选争议解决方式（且很可能多数案件均如此），可以基于特定需要寻求同意以仲裁的方式解决，前提是产生的争议适合仲裁。
If an option is very important for you, and you wish to defer the final decision as to forum until the particular disputes arises, consider whether you can seek it on a unilateral basis (although take care about enforceability of unilateral clauses around the world). If arbitration is the real forum of choice (as it probably was intended to be in this shareholders agreement) then say so, use “shall” and mean “must”. Alternatively, if courts are likely to be the preferred forum in most cases, consent to arbitration could be sought on an ad hoc basis as and when a suitable dispute arises.
最后，请记住许可仲裁的协议不一定在所有辖区均具有约束力，例如，中国还要求协议中包含一个明确且毫不含糊的通过仲裁解决争议的意图[5]。
Finally, remember that permissive arbitration agreements may not be binding in all jurisdictions. The PRC for example requires, among other things, a clear and unequivocal intention to settle disputes by arbitration.[5]
注/Note:
1 参见案件Lobb Partnership Ltd 诉 Aintree Racecourse Co Ltd [2000] CLC 431。
See for example Lobb Partnership Ltd v Aintree Racecourse Co Ltd [2000] CLC 431.
2 遵循法官Clarke在Rainy Sky SA诉Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900（第30段）中的方式。
Following the approach of Lord Clarke in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900, at para. 30.
3 Bremer Vulkan诉South India Corp [1981] AC 909.
Bremer Vulkan v South India Corp [1981] AC 909.
4 NB Three Shipping Ltd. 诉Harebell Shipping Ltd. [2004] APP.L.R. 10/13.
NB Three Shipping Ltd. v Harebell Shipping Ltd. [2004] APP.L.R. 10/13.
5 黄滔，“中国法律下仲裁协议的有效性”（金杜中国法律博客，2012年6月26日）
Huang Tao, ‘The Validity of Arbitration Agreements under Chinese Law’ (www.chinalawinsight.com, 26 June 2012)
