通行的代价——霍尔木兹的未来可能伴随收费
The price of passage — Hormuz’s future may come with a fee
NTERNATIONAL law does not allow any country, however powerful, to appoint itself guardian of the rights of all other states and charge for protection. Yet amid the outlandish headlines — from Washington floating transit tolls to Tehran demanding payment for passage — a more serious conversation is beginning to take shape around the future governance of the Strait of Hormuz.
国际法不允许任何国家，无论其多么强大，自行任命为所有其他国家权利的守护者并收取保护费。然而，在那些怪诞的头条新闻中——从华盛顿提出过境通行费，到德黑兰要求通行付款——围绕霍尔木兹海峡未来治理的一场更为严肃的对话正在开始形成。
Any Iranian attempt to impose unilateral tolls would have no legal basis and would set a dangerous precedent. Freedom of navigation cannot be contingent on Tehran’s permission or ability to collect revenue from international shipping. But while such ideas were dismissed outright only weeks ago, policymakers and industry figures are increasingly conceding that a post-conflict Hormuz may require a new framework — and that framework may involve some form of fee structure.
伊朗任何单方面征收通行费的企图都将没有法律依据，并将开创一个危险的先例。航行自由不能取决于德黑兰的许可或从国际航运中收取收入的能力。但是，尽管仅在几周前这些想法还被彻底否定，政策制定者和行业人士正越来越多地承认，冲突后的霍尔木兹可能需要一个新的框架——而该框架可能涉及某种形式的收费结构。
Greek shipowner Evangelos Marinakis was one of the first to articulate the argument publicly. Speaking during Posidonia in June, he suggested that vessels transiting Hormuz could pay a charge linked to maintaining safe passage through the waterway. The proposal initially appeared far-fetched. It now appears to be attracting more attention in policy circles than many assumed.
希腊船东埃万耶洛斯·马里纳基斯是最早公开阐述这一论点的人之一。他在6月波塞冬海事展期间发言时建议，过境霍尔木兹的船舶可以支付一笔与维护该水道安全通行相关的费用。该提议最初显得牵强。现在，它在政策圈内似乎比许多人原先以为的更受关注。
Marinakis’s argument is straightforward. Shipping already pays heavily for instability through war-risk premiums that can run from $1m-$3m per voyage. If a transparent and internationally accepted system could restore predictable navigation, the cost of a modest transit charge could be more than offset by lower insurance costs and reduced market disruption.
马里纳基斯的论点直截了当。航运业已经通过战争险保费为不稳定性付出高昂代价，每航次可达100万至300万美元。如果一个透明且国际公认的系统能够恢复可预测的航行，那么适度的过境费成本完全可以通过更低的保险费用和减少的市场混乱来抵消。
The economic logic is difficult to ignore. Oxford Economics estimates that a $1-per-barrel levy on oil moving through Hormuz could generate almost $7bn annually at pre-war volumes, exceeding the Suez Canal’s recent revenue. Even so, any future regime would need to be non-discriminatory, transparent and explicitly linked to services such as navigational safety, environmental protection and traffic management if it is to remain compatible with international law.
其经济逻辑难以忽视。牛津经济研究院估计，按战前流量，对通过霍尔木兹的石油每桶征收1美元的税费，每年可产生近70亿美元，超过苏伊士运河近期的收入。即便如此，任何未来的制度若要继续与国际法相符，都需具有非歧视性、透明性，并明确与航行安全、环境保护和交通管理等服务挂钩。
The broader point is that the debate has already moved beyond the binary question of whether Hormuz is open or closed. The old model no longer fits the corridor. What has emerged since the escalation of 2026 is neither blockade nor normalisation, but the early outlines of a new institutional framework governing one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
更广泛的观点是，争论已经超越了霍尔木兹是开放还是关闭这一二元问题。旧的模式不再适合这条走廊。自2026年局势升级以来所呈现的，既不是封锁，也不是正常化，而是管理这一世界最重要海上咽喉要道之一的新制度框架的初步轮廓。
Whether that ultimately takes the form of joint Iran-Oman oversight, a broader Middle East Gulf-led arrangement or another mechanism altogether remains unclear. What is increasingly evident, however, is that a sustainable post-conflict settlement will require more than naval deterrence and temporary ceasefires.
这最终是采取伊朗-阿曼联合监督的形式、更广泛的由中东海湾国家主导的安排，还是完全另一种机制，尚不清楚。然而，越来越明显的是，可持续的冲突后解决方案将需要的不只是海军威慑和临时停火。
The risk calculus in Hormuz is no longer defined solely by the threat of closure. It is increasingly shaped by the rules, obligations and governance structures being assembled around the waterway. The future of Hormuz may not depend on who controls the strait, but on who writes the rulebook.
霍尔木兹的风险计算不再仅由关闭威胁来定义。它正日益受到围绕该水道正在形成的规则、义务和治理结构的塑造。霍尔木兹的未来可能不取决于谁控制海峡，而取决于谁编写规则手册。
转译自《劳氏日报》主编理查德·米德（Richard Meade）2026年7月15日