Recently, Japan once again made statements regarding the so-called “South China Sea Arbitration Award,” openly supporting a ruling that remains highly controversial. In response, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that if the standards applied by the so-called award were accepted, even Taiping Island in the Nansha (Spratly) Islands—which has a considerable land area, fresh water resources, and a long history of human activity—would not qualify as an island capable of generating an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Under the same logic, Japan’s claim of a vast EEZ based on Okinotorishima Reef would also face serious questions.
On the surface, this dispute appears to be a debate over the interpretation of international law. In reality, it reflects a deeper question:
How should a country reassess and safeguard its maritime interests after experiencing historical decline and later national revival?
I. Maritime Rights Have Always Been Closely Linked to National Strength
Looking back at modern Chinese history, one undeniable fact is that China was historically a continental civilization with relatively limited maritime capabilities.
Although China has a long tradition of maritime activities, it gradually fell behind Western maritime powers after the rise of modern industrialization and naval competition.
From the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China period, China experienced internal turmoil and external aggression. The Opium Wars and the First Sino-Japanese War repeatedly demonstrated a fundamental truth:
A country without strong maritime capabilities cannot effectively safeguard its maritime interests, even if it possesses a long coastline and abundant marine resources.
When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the country faced enormous challenges of reconstruction. Its economy was weak and its naval capabilities were still at an early stage. For a considerable period, China’s priority was national development and domestic security, while its ability to safeguard maritime interests remained limited.
Against this historical background, some neighboring countries gradually expanded their activities in certain areas of the South China Sea and developed competing claims.
This reflects a basic reality of international relations:
When a country lacks sufficient strength, its strategic space and interests may be constrained. When its national power recovers, it will inevitably reassess its security boundaries and interests.
II. Historical Issues Cannot Simply Be Replaced by Later Developments
The South China Sea dispute did not emerge overnight. It is the result of a long historical evolution.
China’s position regarding the Nansha Islands and related waters is based on its understanding of historical administration, activities, and jurisdiction in the region. Although the early decades after 1949 were marked by significant national challenges and limited maritime capabilities, this does not mean that historical claims were automatically abandoned.
A country’s temporary inability to safeguard its interests does not necessarily mean that it has relinquished those interests.
Just as economic development progresses through different stages, a country’s ability to protect maritime interests also changes with the growth of national strength.
Today’s China is fundamentally different from China decades ago.
China has developed world-leading manufacturing capabilities, growing technological strength, a massive maritime economy, and increasingly sophisticated maritime capabilities.
When a country that was once weak regains the ability to protect its interests, renewed attention to maritime rights becomes a natural consequence of national development.
III. Rules Cannot Become Selective Tools
International order requires rules, but rules must be applied consistently.
If a particular interpretation of international law is used to challenge the rights of one country, the same standards should also apply to those who advocate and support such interpretations.
This is the core logic behind China’s response.
If certain standards are used to deny Taiping Island the ability to generate an EEZ, should the same standards not also apply to other similar maritime features?
If rules constrain only others while exempting oneself, then rules risk becoming instruments of geopolitical competition rather than universal principles.
The international community needs not selective rules serving individual interests, but an international order based on equal application and shared acceptance.
IV. Japan’s Involvement in the South China Sea Requires Attention to Its Strategic Intentions
In recent years, Japan has increasingly involved itself in South China Sea issues and expanded its regional role through cooperation with the United States and other partners.
From a historical perspective, Japan’s strategic adjustments in regional security affairs deserve careful attention, given the historical suffering caused by Japan’s wartime aggression against Asian countries.
A truly responsible country should confront history honestly and contribute to regional stability through cooperation, rather than use regional disputes to expand its own strategic influence.
The South China Sea is not a direct territorial dispute involving Japan. Japan’s increasing involvement reflects its broader ambition to influence the future regional order.
V. China’s Return to the Ocean Is a Historical Necessity
The development of the Chinese nation is also a process of moving from a primarily continental civilization toward a maritime-oriented power.
In the past, China stayed away from the ocean because of weakness. Today, China is returning to the ocean because of development.
This does not mean seeking expansion or challenging other countries. It represents the normal strategic choice of a country with more than 1.4 billion people and the world’s second-largest economy.
A country cannot remain permanently in a state of historical weakness, nor can it be denied the right to protect its interests simply because it lacked the capability to do so in the past.
The ocean belongs to all humanity, but maritime rights must be based on a combination of history, law, and contemporary realities.
The resolution of the South China Sea issue requires wisdom, dialogue, and respect for historical facts.
China has entered a new stage of development.
A China that better understands, embraces, and develops its maritime interests will inevitably play a more active role in shaping the future maritime order.
This is not expansionism.
It is the reflection of a major country reassessing its development space after a century of historical transformation.

